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THE MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND GAS LEASING 
ON FEDERAL WILDERNESS LANDS 
Stephen S. Edelson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last five years 1 a heated controversy has arisen over the ex-
tent to which federal lands with wilderness qualities2 should be 
dedicated to oil and gas development. Many of our most cherished 
wildlands coincide with geological formations that have recently 
emerged as tempting targets of our prodigious appetites for profit 
and energy. This conflict calls for caution and a rational selectivity in 
allowing energy development in wilderness. The current administra-
tion has nevertheless indicated a willingness to lease nearly any 
wilderness land that is sought for oil and gas development. 
Moreover, the government frequently issues oil and gas leases in 
wilderness after only cursory environmental analysis and without 
adequate environmental protection in the lease terms. Regretably, 
these lands are leased at subsidized prices, which only increases the 
incentive to develop rather than preserve lands with wilderness 
qualities. 
The broad conflict concerning the management of these lands 
recently has emerged as a legal dispute challenging the gov-
ernment's leasing procedures. Specifically, the dispute is over which 
of three available leasing approaches conforms with and satisfies 
decisionmaking requirements of the National Environmental Policy 
• B.A., Yale University 1977; J.D., University of Virginia 1983. 
1. This article is current as of April 1983. 
2. What constitutes "wilderness qualities" varies from person to person, but most people 
would probably agree that wilderness is pristine, scenic in some sense, and offers solitude. 
Quoting Congress' definition of wilderness in the Wilderness Act is apparently de rigueur for 
any article on the topic: 
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Act (NEPA).3 These three approaches, described below, may be 
termed "Environmental Impact Statement leasing," "Environmen-
tal Assessment leasing," and "Contingent Rights Stipulation leas-
ing." 
NEP A requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) before taking any action that may have signifi-
cant environmental impacts.' Essentially, an EIS is a detailed state-
ment of any environmental impacts of an action; it requires thorough 
study of such possible impacts. It would appear that any leasing pro-
posal involving large wilderness acreages requires an EIS under 
NEPA. The government, however, has preceded even its largest 
leasing proposals, covering up to a million acres each, by preparing 
only Environmental Assessments (EAs). EAs are documents that 
certify that a given leasing proposal does not have potential for 
significant environmental impact. In the context of public lands leas-
ing, the government agencies' justification for a finding of no signifi-
cant impact in certifications rests on lease stipulations which 
regulate the conduct of oil and gas drilling operations by lessees. 
This approach to leasing is referred to as "EA leasing." The govern-
ment has recently initiated a third approach to leasing in which it 
avoids initial environmental analysis by conditioning leases with the 
Contingent Rights Stipulation (CRS).5 The CRS itself purports to 
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate 
the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of 
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An 
area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of undeveloped 
Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent im-
provements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve 
its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily 
by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) 
has outstanding opportunities for .solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of 
recreation; (3) has at lell$t five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to 
make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may 
also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, 
or historical value. 
16 U.S.C. 1131(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
In this article, the term "designated wilderness" refers to lands in the National Wilderness 
Preservation System (NWPS). "Wilderness candidate" refers to the several categories of land 
that have been administratively or congressionally classified for possible inclusion in the 
NWPS. These include "RARE II," "recommended wilderness," and "further planning areas," 
"Bureau of Land Management wilderness study areas," and "congressionally-designated 
wilderness study areas." See infra text and notes at notes 20, 25-38. The term wilderness is 
used generically to mean designated wilderness, wilderness candidates, and all other lands 
with wilderness qualities. 
3. 42 U.S.C. SS 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
4. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
5. 47 Fed. Reg. 18,158 (April 28, 1982). 
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make all of a lessee's development rights contingent rather than 
vested, thereby postponing the need for environmental analysis until 
a lessee has prospected on his lease and actually seeks permission to 
begin drilling. These three leasing approaches differ dramatically in 
their potential for wilderness protection and will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
The introductory section of this article explains the sources of the 
present leasing and management conflict by providing background 
information on the administrative organization of wilderness lands, 
the process of development of oil and gas leases, and the system for 
issuing leases. The current leasing situation and the NEP A com-
pliance issue are presented next. Part III examines Sierra Club v. 
Peterson, a federal district court decision affirming the 
government's reliance on the EA leasing approach to large-scale 
wilderness leasing.6 Part III addresses the new Contingent Rights 
Stipulation leasing system. The section questions the CRS approach 
and its purported ability to fulfill the requirements of NEP A, and 
further points to its inefficacies and other defects as a land manage-
ment tool. The remainder of the article treats the implications of the 
available wilderness leasing policies. Specifically, section IV argues 
that the government's leasing approach unwisely aims at the 
wholesale leasing of virtually all sought-after wilderness areas 
without sufficient attention to environmental analysis, environmen-
tally protective lease stipulations, or internal contradictions in agen-
cy policy. Section V proposes that future leasing in wilderness occur 
only on a truly selective basis with thorough environmental analysis. 
It also proposes a rate increase for leasing, at least in wilderness 
areas, as a sound "free market" approach toward attaining rational 
selectivity in the leasing of public lands for development. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY 
Interest in developing wilderness lands for oil and gas increased 
dramatically at the close of the 1970's. Since that time, the future of 
our pristine lands amidst development pressure has been a con-
troversy of front-page proportions. The chief factor responsible is 
the drastic rise in the price of oil and other energy sources, which in-
creased the economic attractiveness of domestic oil and gas produc-
tion. 7 A second factor is the impending deadline for new leasing in 
6. 17 ERC 1449 (D.D.C. March 31,1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1695 (D.C. Cir. August 
19,1982). 
7. Sumner, Oil and Gas Leasing in Wilderness-What the Conflict is About, Sierra, at 28, 
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designated wilderness areas set by the Wilderness Act of 1964.8 
Under the Wilderness Act, no new leasing may occur in designated 
wilderness after the end of 1983.9 Finally, the federal government 
recently has encouraged the domestic production of oil for national 
security and balance of trade reasons.10 These factors have been 
translated into federal policies favoring oil and energy development 
on public lands. While both the Carter and Reagan administrations 
have maintained such policies, the current administration has aban-
doned its predecessor's attempt to minimize development on the 
small fraction of federal land that has wilderness qualities. The 
Reagan administration is the first, for example, to attempt oil and 
gas leasing in designated wilderness areas. ll 
Unfortunately, some of the most precious and ecologically 
vulnerable wildlands are also areas of high oil and gas resource 
potential. This is true for the fragile tundra of the Alaskan North 
Slope, which is close to the rich Prudhoe Bay oil fields. 12 It is also the 
case in the Western Overthrust Belt, a geological formation that 
runs in the continental United States along the eastern edge of the 
Rocky Mountains from Montana to New Mexico.13 The Overthrust 
Belt is an area of complex geology, where oil is generally found only 
in small deep pockets. Due to the geology and the terrain, oil produc-
tion here tends to be particularly costly and environmentally 
destructive. 14 
The wilderness leasing controversy is by no means restricted to 
Alaska and the West. Oil and gas leases are pending in the majority 
of states east of the Mississippi that have national forestland. 16 The 
31 (May/June 1982). The barrel price of domestic crude oil increased from $3.39 in 1972 to 
$33.76 in July 1981. Edsall, Boom & Bust: Economic Ills Strain Alliance oj Oilmen, GOP, 
Washington Post, Apr. 25, 1983 at 1, col. 1. 
8. 16 U.S.C. §S 1121-1136 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
9. 16 U.S.C. S 1133(d)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
10. U.S. DEP'T OF THE I!-.TTEI:lOR, A YEAR OF CHANGE: To RESTORE AMERICA'S GREATNESS 
Jan. 1981, cover letter, 1 (hereinafter cited as DOl REPORT 1981]. 
11. 46 Fed. Reg. 27,734 (May 21, 1981) (planned leasing in Washakie Wilderness, 
Wyoming); 46 Fed. Reg. 27,735 (May 21, 1981) (planned leasing Bob Marshall, Great Bear, 
Scapegoat, and Mission Mountains Wildernesses, Montana). 
12. See, e.g., Alaska Lands Act P.L. 96-487 (December 2, 1980) §§ 1001-1011, 16 U.S.C. 
3141-3151 (Supp. IV 1980). 
13. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: OIL AND GAS LEASE DEVELOPMENT, MT. VIEW, 
EVANSTON & KAMAs RANGER DISTRICTS, U.S. DEPT AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, WASATCH-
CACHE NATIONAL FOREST 13-25 (January 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as HIGH UNITAS EA]. 
14. Id .. 
15. There is also an Eastern Overthrust Belt, but it is less significant and less promising 
than the Western Overthrust Belt. See Nelson, Oil and Gas Leasing On Forest Service Lands: 
A Question ojNEPA Compliance, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1982). 
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Forest Service has, for example, recently attempted to lease 150,000 
acres of the Hoosier National Forest in Indiana16 and 273,000 acres 
of the Green Mountain National Forest in VermontY 
A. Wilderness Administrative Structure 
The federal government owns 410 million acres of land in the 
lower forty-eight states. This amounts to 22 percent of the total 
acreage of the continental United StateS.18 The vast majority of 
these lands are under the jurisdiction of four federal agencies. In the 
Department of Interior, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
manages 175 million acres; the National Park Service manages 20 
million acres; and the Fish and Wildlife Service manages the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System, which consists of 9 million acres.19 In 
the Department of Agriculture, the Forest Service manages the Na-
tional Forest System, which contains 167 million acres.20 
Each agency's domain includes significant wilderness acreage. 
Many of these wilderness lands are "designated wilderness" or 
"wilderness candidates." Designated wilderness lands are those 
which have been statutorily designated for special management as 
part of the National Wilderness Preservation System.21 "Wilderness 
candidate" lands comprise several different administrative cat-
Oil and Gas leases are pending inter alia in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont (letter to Howard Fox from Steve Yurich, Regional Forester, Forest Service Region 9 
(November 16, 1982»; in Alabama (letter to John M. McMillan, Jr. from Joe J. Brown, Forest 
Supervisor, Alabama National Forests (October 27, 1982»; in Arkansas (Sumner, supra note 
7, at 29); in Georgia (ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REPORT, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OIL AND 
GAS LEASING IN CHATTAHOOCHEE-OCONEE NATIONAL FORESTS, U.S. DEP'T AGRICULTURE 
FOREST SERVICE (January 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as CHATTAHOOCHEE EA]); in South 
Carolina (letter to Stephen S. Edelson from Donald W. Eng, Forest Supervisor, Francis, 
Marion & Sumter N.F. (November 11,1982»; in Tennessee (letter to Stephen S. Edelson from 
Donald L. Rollens, Forest Supervisor, Cherokee N.F. (November 23, 1982»; and in Virginia 
(letter to George M. Smith, Forest Supervisor, George Washington N.F. from Ernie Dicker-
man (November 30, 1981». 
16. NOTICE OF DECISION, U.S. DEP'T AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE CONSENT TO ISSUANCE OF 
OIL AND GAS LEASES, HOOSIER NAT'L FOREST, INDIANA (August 6, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
HOOSIER DECISION NOTICE]. 
17. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, ISSUANCE OF OIL AND GAS LEASES, GREEN MOUNTAIN NA· 
TIONAL FOREST, VERMONT, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE (June 16, 1982) 
[hereinafter cited as GREEN MOUNTAIN EA]. 
18. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 9 
(1981). The total acreage of the continental United States is 1902 million acres. The figures 
that follow in the text deal only with the lower forty-eight states. 
19. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 19-22. 
20. [d. at 13. 
21. The National Wilderness Preservation System was established in 1964 by the 
Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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egories of lands which are being considered for statutory wilderness 
designation. The specific categories of various wilderness candidate 
lands and the management standards applied vary from agency to 
agency. That lands are classified as designated wilderness, 
wilderness candidate, or without a wilderness classification is fre-
quently due to the existence of resource conflicts and other political 
and historic factors rather than the actual or relative wilderness 
quality of the lands.22 
Currently, in the lower forty-eight states there are 23.8 million 
acres of designated wilderness and 59.1 million acres in various 
wilderness categories.23 Most of these designated wilderness areas 
are National Forest lands managed by the Forest Service; the rest 
are divided among the three land management agencies in the In-
terior Department-BLM, National Park Service, and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service.24 The Forest Service wilderness candidate lands 
consist of 7 million acres of RARE II "recommended wilderness,"25 
5.9 million acres of RARE II "further planning areas,"26 and 2.4 
million acres of "congressionally-mandated wilderness study 
areas."27 There are also 24 million acres of "BLM wilderness study 
22. For example, a prejudice favoring protection of forest over non-forest land among en-
vironmentalists and others presumably explains why the public lands administered by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the lower forty-eight states, which are primarily non-
forest, contain only 12,000 acres of desig-J1ated wilderness. See infra note 24. Conflicts with 
non~wilderness resources was the main factor that kept Forest Service lands suitable for 
wilderness from becoming "recommended wilderness." See infra text and notes at notes 
34-36. Similarly, resource conflicts allegedly factored in BLM's selection of "wilderness study 
areas" despite Congress' contrary instructions in the Froeral Land Management Policy Act, 
43 U.S.C. 1782(a) (Supp. III 1979). Baker, BLM Wilderness Review: New Beginning, Same Old 
Story?, Sierra, at 50, 54 (Mar.lApr. 1983). 
23. WILDERNESS FACT SHEET, RECREATION MANAGEMENT STAFF, FOREST Sl;:RVICE U.S. 
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE (March 8, 1982) (as of 12/31/81). The National Wilderness Preservation 
System when established in 1964 by the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132a (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980), contained 9.1 million aCi-es. C. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 774 (1981). The system has grown to its present size of 80 million 
acres through subsequent additions mandated in numerous wilderness bills, Wilderness Fact 
Sheets, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of Dec. 1980, P.L. 96-487, 
SS 701-05, 94 Stat. 2371, 2417-20, 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV 1980). 
24. Of the 23.3 million acres of designated wilderness in the continental U.S., the Forest 
Service administers 19.7 million, BLM administers 12,000, the Park Service manages 3.0 
;-.lillion, and the Fish and Wildlife Service manages 0.7 million. WILDERNESS FACT SHEET, 
supra n.23. 
25. Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water on S.2801 
(Wilderness Act of 1982) (September 23, 1982) (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop). The 
Reagan Administration has "unrecommended" some of these lands. 
26.Id. 
27. WILDERNESS FACT SHEET, supra n.23, table 6. 
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areas"28 and 19.8 million acres of wilderness candidate under the 
National Park Service and Fish and Wildlife Service.29 Thus, of the 
federal land in the continental United States, 6 percent is designated 
wilderness and 14 percent is wilderness candidate acreage. 30 
Most of the Forest Service wilderness candidate lands were se-
lected by the Service's Roadless Area Review and Evaluation II 
(RARE 11).31 This study was mandated by the Wilderness Act of 
196432 and completed in November 1979.33 After surveying the 
roadless lands of the Forest Service, the study divided the lands into 
three categories: non wilderness, which was proposed for release 
from further consideration as wilderness;34 recommended wil-
28. Comment, Tenth Circuit Approves Interior's Wilderness Protection Policies in Energy-
Rich Rocky Mountain Region, 13 ENVT'L L. REP. 1004, 1005 (1983). See Rocky Mountain Oil 
and Gas Association v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1348 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 13 ELR 20036. (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1982). This figure is 
not adjusted for the major deletions recently made or those soon to be made by BLM. See infra 
note 96. 
29. Id. at 9. The National Park Service has recommended 10.2 million acres of land it 
manages in the lower forty-eight states under the wilderness review instructions in the 
Wilderness Act, the Eastern Wilderness Act, and other legislation. Telephone interview with 
Jeffrey Chidlaw, Outdoor Recreation Planner, Division of Parks and Special Studies, National 
Park Service (April 21, 1983). A further 6.2 million acres of non-Alaskan NPS land are subject 
to wilderness studies in progress, pursuant to other legislation. Id. Of the non-Alaskan land 
under Fish and Wildlife Service jurisdiction, 3.4 million acres are "wilderness opportunity 
areas proposed to Congress." Telephone interview with Jonathan Gold, Land Acquisition 
Specialist, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (April 14, 1983). 
30. Alaska has 56 million acres of designated wilderness, with 5 million under the Forest 
Service, 32 million under the Park Service and 19 million under the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
WILDERNESS FACT SHEET, supra n.23. There are also 2 million acres of congressionally-
designated wilderness study areas in the Chugach National Forest. Id. Section 1317 of the 
Alaska Lands Act requires that all Alaskan lands that are in the National Park System or Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System but not designated wilderness be reviewed for wilderness 
suitability and recommended to Congress for wilderness or non-wilderness by 1987. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 32005 (Supp. IV 1980). However, that section expressly provides that the wilderness review 
and recommendations are not to be construed as affecting the admininstration of the areas. Id. 
As of June 1982, there were 293 million acres of federal land in the State, with 23 million 
under the Forest Service, 142 million under BLM, 50 million under the Park Service, and 75 
million under the Fish and Wildlife Service. Telephone interview with Grant Guidry, Informa-
tion Officer, Office of Public Mfairs, BLM, U.S. Dep't of Interior (Apr. 25, 1983). BLM's do-
main will eventually decrease to 74 million acres when the selections by the State and Native 
corporations are complete. Id. Alaska contains 365 million acres. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, 
supra note 18 at 9. 
31. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ROADLESS AREA REVIEW AND EVALUATION, U.S. 
DEP'T AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE (FS-325) (January 1979) [hereinafter cited as RARE II]. 
32. Id. at 5. 
33.Id. 
34. Id. at 9. But see California v. Bergland, 438 F. Supp. 465 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Califor-
nia v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (lands designated as non-wilderness by RARE II may 
not be administered as such because environmental analysis was inadequate). 
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derness, which was endorsed by President Carter for inclusion into 
the wilderness system; and an intermediate category, further plan-
ning areas (FPAs).35 FPAs contain lands that meet the statutory 
definition of wilderness but which, because of other factors such as 
mineral potential, were not immediately allocated to either 
wilderness or nonwilderness.36 The BLM wilderness study areas 
were selected as a result of a similar study of BLM lands which was 
mandated by the Federal Land Management Policy Act of 1976 
(FLPMA).37 Congressionally-mandated wilderness study areas 
became wilderness candidates by act of Congress.38 
B. The Development Process 
A basic knowledge of the process of oil and gas development is re-
quired to understand fully the wilderness controversy.39 The process 
of oil and gas development generally occurs in three stages: 
prospecting, exploratory drilling,40 and production. In the prospect-
ing stage, a number of investigatory measures may be undertaken, 
including on-site examination, aerial surveys, radar mapping, and 
seismic surveying.41 Seismic surveying is the most important of 
these techniques since it is the most expensive and almost always 
precedes drilling.42 Seismic mapping involves creating shoek waves, 
either with a mechanical "thumper" or with dynamite explosions, at 
a series of points along a line on the ground. The shock waves are 
transmitted through the ground, and are recorded and analyzed to 
gain information about the underlying formations. In mountainous 
areas, dynamite is the generally-used agent, with crew transporta-
tion by helicopter.43 A number of threatened and endangered 
35. RARE II, supra note 31, at 9. 
36.Id. 
37. Pub. L. No. 94-579, (October 21, 1976) § 603, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (Supp. III 1979). 
38. WILDERNESS FACT SHEET, supra, n.23. 
39. For a detailed discussion of the process of oil and gas development and its environmen-
tal impacts, see Noble, Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands: NEPA Gets Lost in the Shuffle, 6 
HARV. ENVT'L L. REV., 117, 120-130 (1982). Two other major law review articles on oil and gas 
leasing in wilderness appeared during 1982. Martin, The Interrelationship of the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search 
of Resolution, 12 ENVT'L L. 363 (1982); Nelson, Oil and Gas Leasing on Forest Service Lands: 
A Question ofNEPA Compliance, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1982). 
40. The term "exploration" encompasses both prospecting and exploratory drilling. 
41. ROCK SPRINGS, WYOMING DISTRICT, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, KEMMENER RESOURCE AREA OIL AND GAS LEASING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
RECORD 1-8, A-III-I, A-VII-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as KEMMENER EA]. 
42. Id. at A-III-I. 
43. Mechanical "thumpers" generally require vehicular transport. 
1982-83] FEDERAL WILDERNESS LEASING 913 
species, such as the grizzly bear or the Dall sheep, are timid enough 
in their behavior that their habitat areas can be reduced by seismic 
exploration.44 For the sake of legal analysis, such habitat disruption 
generally is considered to be the only significant effect of prospect-
ing,45 though this view is by no means universal.46 
In the exploratory drilling stage, "wildcat" wells are sunk in 
regions formerly undrilledY This requires the levelling and clearing 
of a drill site of about four acres and the building of an access road, 
covering about six acres per mile of road. Drilling is very noisy and 
generally proceeds on a twenty-four hour basis.4S Living facilities 
must be maintained for a crew of about fifty and a pit constructed for 
holding drilling muds, which are toxic.49 The resulting environmen-
tal injuries include erosion from clearing land, noise, the presence of 
people and machines, and subsurface or surface contamination of 
water and soil by oil or drilling muds.50 The impact of these injuries 
may be more or less severe depending on the precise nature of the 
ecological factors present in an area. In any event, wilderness areas 
by their nature are highly sensitive and reclamation and restoration 
of these areas is exceedingly difficult. 
The production phase begins once commercial quantities of oil or 
gas are discovered. Since this is in many ways a larger-scale version 
of exploratory drilling, it has the same environmental effects, only 
more severe. Production may also require pipelines and gas-
processing facilities. Production in commercial fields commonly lasts 
up to fifty years.51 As a result, while exploratory drilling involves 
scattered sites that usually are abandoned within one or two years, 
production involves a greater concentration of activities the effects 
of which may continue for generations. 
Basically, the agencies' approach to environmental analysis for 
leasing ignores the view that oil development is essentially incom-
patible with wilderness. As stated above, development produces ero-
44. KEMMENER EA, supra note 41, at III-II. 
45. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC 1453. 
46. See, e.g., Sumner, supra note 7, at 28. 
47. Noble, supra note 39, at 121. 
48. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CASPER DISTRICT, WYOM· 
lNG, BUFFALO RESOURCES AREA OIL AND GAS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 86 (1980); TARGHEE 
& BRIDGER· TETON NAT'L FORESTS, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMEN· 
TAL ASSESSMENT FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION IN THE PALISADES FURTHER PLANNING AREA 
38 (June 5,1980) [hereinafter cited as PALISADES EA]. 
49. KEMMENER EA, supra note 41, at III-22. 
50. [d. at III-4-III-ll. 
51. [d. at 1-8,1-13, VI-I. 
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sion, devegetation, noise, and soil and water pollution. Agency en-
vironmental analysis of development focuses on whether these can 
be avoided or restored.52 The extent to which such changes may 
eventually be erased is a matter of controversy. Agency analysis 
fails to look beyond these environmental damages to the unavoidable 
impact on the pristine, scenic, and solitudinal qualities of wilderness. 
Put simply, "wilderness" by definition arguably ceases to exist once 
roads are built through it. 53 It is recognized that once a road is built 
in an undeveloped area, the area will probably never return to its 
former state. There are few, if any, examples of steep mountain 
wilderness that have been effectively restored after roads have been 
built. 
C. The Present Leasing Controversy 
1. The Leasing System 
Responsibility for leasing decisions is divided between the various 
agencies. BLM has primary responsibility for leasing decisions on 
lands under its jurisdiction. 54 Responsibility for leasing on Forest 
Service lands is split between BLM and the Forest Service. The 
allocation varies according to whether land is "public domain" or 
"acquired." Public domain lands are those that have been held by the 
federal government since their original acquisition. 55 The majority of 
Forest Service lands are in the West and Alaska and are public 
domain. Most Eastern National Forests are acquired landS, which 
are those that were once privately held but have since been acquired 
by the government. 56 For Forest Service public domain lands, BLM 
has jurisdiction over the mineral estate, while the Forest Service has 
jurisdiction over the surface. 57 The Forest Service is charged with 
preparing the necessary environmental analysis,58 but by statute 
BLM has final authority over the decision of whether to lease and 
52. See, e.g., GREEN MOUNTAIN EA, supra note 17. 
53. The requirement that land be "roadless" is inherent in the statutory definition of 
"wilderness" in 16 U.S.C. S 1131(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 2. The absence 
of roads on land generally is a statutory prerequisite for consideration for wilderness review as 
well. See, e.g., FLPMA S 603(a), 43 U.S.C. S 1782(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
54. Order of the Sec'y of the Interior No. 2948 (October 6, 1972). 
55. PuBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 187. However, land that has been obtained in 
an exchange for other federal land takes on the public domain or acquired character of the land 
for which it was exchanged. Id. at 181,187. 
56. Id. at 181. See also supra note 55. 
57. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERVICE, 
DEp'T OF AGRICULTURE, INTERIM MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BUREAU OF 
LAND MANAGEMENT AND THE FOREST SERVICE (December 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MOU]. 
58. Id. 
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lease terms.59 By agreement and convention, the Forest Service 
issues a proposal either to not lease or to lease with specified terms, 
and BLM generally accedes to the proposal. 60 In contrast, BLM is 
empowered to lease acquired Forest Service land, only with Forest 
Service permission.6l 
Oil and gas development on federal onshore lands occurs under 
two leasing systems.62 The vast majority of federal oil and gas leases 
are issued under a noncompetitive leasing system.63 The process 
begins when firms or individuals submit applications for public lands 
they would like to lease. The first party that submits a proper ap-
plication conforming to the applicable agency standards is entitled to 
receive a lease if the government decides that one should be issued.64 
The agencies may act on individual leases, or, as is the practice of the 
Forest Service, consider all the leases in one area collectively.65 Non-
competitive leases cost one dollar per acre per year plus a 12.5 per-
cent royalty on any revenue produced. They run for an initial term of 
ten years.66 
A very small percentage of onshore land is leased through the com-
petitive leasing system, under which the government auctions off 
areas of known commercial potential to the highest bidder.67 Unfor-
tunately for the public coffers, only lands overlying a "known 
geologic structure" are issued competitively, and that term is so nar-
rowly defined68 that only 3 percent of the federal onshore leases are 
issued under this system.69 Competitive leases run for a five-year in-
itial term with the minimum rent of two dollars per acre per y.ear and 
a minimum royalty rate of 12.5 percent.70 The royalty rate may be in-
59. The Forest Service has no authority to control leasing on public domain land under the 
Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. SS 187,226 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Chevron Oil Co., 24 IBLA 
159, 163 (1976). 
60. MOU, supra note 57, at 4. 
61. Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. 351-59 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The 
same is true for designated wilderness, 16 U.S.C. S 1133(dX3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
62. HALL, aYNES, ZABLER, & WHITE, TASK FORCE WORKING PAPER, ONSHORE OIL AND GAS 
LEASING POLICY REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR 37 (March 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
LEASING POLICY REVIEW]. 
63. Id at 40. When non-competitive leases expire they are reissued through a lottery system 
and called Simultaneous Oil and Gas Leases. 
64. Id. at 38. 
65. See, e.g., PALISADES EA, supra note 48. 
66. LEASING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 62, at 39. 
67. Id. at 42. 
68. Id. "A known geologic structure is technically the trap in which an accumulation of oil or 
gas has been discovered by drilling and determined to be productive, the limits of which in-
clude all acreage that is presumptively productive." 43 C.F.R. S 3100.0-(a) (1977). 
69. LEASING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 62, at 40. 
70. Id. at 37, 39, 42. 
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creased in the bidding process, which also may involve bonus 
payments. 71 
To set the terms of individual leases, stipulations are attached to 
the lease forms. Stipulations may, for example, prevent drilling 
within 200 feet of hiking trails or during certain seasons of the 
year.72 The strict No Surface Occupancy (NSO) Stipulation prohibits 
drilling on the leased land itself, so that any access to the leased 
minerals must be by directional (slant) drilling from outside the lease 
area. 73 
In general, a lessee may proceed with prospecting activities as 
soon as a lease is granted. However, before drilling, a lessee must 
submit and obtain approval of an Application for a Permit to Drill 
(APD).74 Leases may be renewed if drilling or production is occur-
ring on the date of expiration. 76 
2. Current Leasing Policy 
The Reagan administration's policy is to aggressively increase oil 
and gas leasing even on wilderness lands.76 The threat to designated 
wilderness has been neutralized, at least for the moment, by litiga-
tion, congressional action, and public pressure. This is not the case 
for wilderness candidates and other federal lands with wilderness 
qualities. 
71. Sprague & Julian, An Analysis of the Impact of An All Competitive Leasing System on 
Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Revenue, 10 NAT'L RES. J. 515, 522 (1970). 
72. HIGH UNITAS EA, supra note 13, at E-7, E-21. 
73. Id. at E-3. 
74. Prospecting permits are required to begin seismic activities, but obtaining these once a 
lease has been issued is generally routine. Id. at 9. 
75. LEASING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 62, at 37. 
76. See Noble, supra note 39, at 118 & n.13; Nelson, supra note 15, at 4-5. In the year 1981 
alone the amount of onshore acreage leased was 150% greater than that of the 1980 acreage; 
in 1982 acreage leased was double the 1981 acreage. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A YEAR OF 
PRooRESS: PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Jan. 1982 at 1 [hereinafter cited as DOl REPORT 
1982]. 
The Reagan administration is the first to propose leasing in designated wilderness and con-
tinues to eliminate substantial wilderness candidate areas. See supra text and notes at notes 
11, 26; infra text and note at note 96. The administration has proposed delaying the 
Wilderness Act ban on mineral development for 20 years or its termination by the year 2000. 
DOl REPORT 1981, supra note 10, at 3; Dougherty, District Court's Approval of Bob Marshall 
Withdrawal Upstaged by Watt's Proposed Wilderness Legislation, 12 ENVT'L L. REP. 10034, 
10036 (1982). In contrast to previous congresses, the Ninety-Seventh Congress approved only 
130,000 new acres of designated wilderness. In addition, President Reagan has vetoed Con-
gress's approval of some 49,000 acres as designated wilderness - the first such presidential 
veto ever made. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) Current Dev. 1620 (Jan. 21, 1983); New York Times, 
Aug. 14, 1982, at 8, col. 3. 
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The Wilderness Act of 1964 provides that oil and gas leasing may 
continue in designated wilderness areas through 1983, and is pro-
hibited thereafter. 77 This is the result of a political compromise when 
the Act was passed in 1964. Anti-leasing forces obtained a statutory 
prohibition on leasing in designated wilderness, but leasing pro-
ponents delayed its effective date for twenty years.78 It has been the 
policy of all previous administrations to not lease in designated 
wilderness, and only a small handful of leases containing 
"designated wilderness" has ever been issued.79 
In contrast, the present administration has come forward with ma-
jor initiatives for designated wilderness leasing. For example, in 
1981, the Department of the Interior attempted to issue leases in 
four Montana designated wilderness areas, including the Bob Mar-
shall Wilderness.8o The House Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs invoked the legislative veto provision of FLPMA,81 and ordered 
the withdrawal of these areas from leasing consideration.82 
Although a subsequent .federal district court decision ruled that the 
Secretary of the Interior had sole authority over the duration of the 
withdrawal,8a Secretary of Interior James Watt agreed not to lease 
in designated wilderness until the end of 1982.84 BLM did issue a few 
leases in New Mexico's Cabinet Mountain Wilderness in 1981,85 but 
the lessees agreed to exchange the wilderness portions of their 
leases for acreage in other areas after a lawsuit was filed challenging 
the leases. 86 
During 1982, Congress passed appropriations riders prohibit-
ing the processing or issuance of leases in designated wilderness 
through September 1983.87 After this date, there is a three-month 
window until the leasing prohibition in the Wilderness Act becomes 
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
78. C. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 774. 
79. 46 Fed. Reg. 27,735, 27,735 (May 21, 1981). 
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 27,735 (May 21, 1981); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 
982, clarified, 1194 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mont. 1981). 
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
82. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. at 986. 
83. [d. at 982. 
84. Dougherty, supra note 76, at 10026 n.38 (1982). 
85. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 8, Sierra Club v. Watt, 
No. _ (D.N.M. filed February 23,1982). . 
86. Sierra Club v. Watt. No. _ (D.N.M. filed February 23, 1982) (subsequently settled). 
87. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 (Oct. 2, 1982), Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 
126, 96 Stat. 1186, 1196, 16 U.S.C. § 1132; Int. Dep't and Related Agencies, Appropriations 
for Fiscal Year 1983 (Dec. 30, 1982), Pub. L. No. 97-394, S 308, 96 Stat. 1966, 1996-97, 16 
U.S.C. S 1132. 
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effective. Secretary of the Interior Watt has agreed not to attempt 
leasing in designated wilderness during this period.88 Thus, barring 
future statutory changes, oil and gas leasing in designated 
wilderness has been permanently prohibited. 
The government also has attempted to lease in RARE II recom-
mended wilderness areas and further planning areas. The govern-
ment has proceeded using the EA approach to leasing. Some of these 
initiatives have been completed without litigation.89 Environmental 
organizations have actively opposed many of the Forest Service deci-
sions to lease major wilderness candidate acreages. Most of these 
proposals are tied up in administrative appeals or litigation.90 Their 
future depends largely on the outcome of Sierra Club v. Peterson. 91 
This case, which was recently argued before the D.C. Circuit, will in-
fluence whether the agencies may continue their current practice of 
EA leasing without the preparation of an EIS. 
The future of wilderness candidates will also hinge on legislative 
developments. In 1982, for example, a wilderness protection bill 
passed the House overwhelmingly, but an identical Senate bill died in 
committee despite having fifty-three co-sponsors.92 This bill applied 
to all states except Alaska and would have withdrawn designated 
wilderness from leasing on a permanent basis, and withdrawn 
Forest Service wilderness candidates on a temporary basis.98 The 
ban on designated wilderness leasing in the current appropriations 
rider also applies to the processing or issuance of leases in RARE II 
recommended wilderness future planning areas and to 
88. 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Current Developments) 1505 (Dec. 31, 1982). 
89. For example, in 1982 leases were successfully issued on RARE II FP As in Tennessee 
(Cherokee letter, supra note 15) and in Georgia (letter to Howard Fox from Steven Briggs, 
Fire and Lands Staff Officer, Chattahoochee-Oconee N.F. (November 15, 1982» without ad-
ministrative appeal or litgation. 
90. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, No. 82-15 GF (D. Mont.); Connor v. Burford, No. 
CV-82-42 BU (D. Mont.); Administrative Appeal of Forest Service Decision to Lease in Green 
Mountain National Forest, Vermont (pending before Forest Service); Administrative Appeal 
of Forest Service Decision to Lease in Hoosier National Forest, Indiana (pending before 
Forest Service). 
91. Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 82-1695 (D.C. Cir. appeal docketed August 19,1982). 
92. Peterson was argued on February 16, 1983 before Circuit Judges MacKinnon, Wright, 
and Scalia. 
93. The proposed Wilderness Protection Act of 1982, H.R. 6542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 
passed the House by a vote of 340 to 58 on August 12, 1982. H5784 (Aug. 12, 1982); Tunder-
man, Preservation vs. Mineral Development of Withdrawn Federal Lands - Much Ado, But 
Little to Show, 13 ENVT'L L. REP. 10017 (1983) 128 CONGo REC. The Senate bill, S. 2801 died in 
the 97th Congress in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Senator McClure 
(R-Idaho), the committee chairman, opposed the bill because it lacked language "releasing" 
non-wilderness. Tunderman, supra note 73, at 10021 (1983). 
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congressionally-mandated wilderness candidate areas. 94 This pro-
vides a brief respite for these areas, but does not apply to BLM 
wilderness study areas or to those federal lands with wilderness or 
other special qualities that are not wilderness candidates. In addi-
tion, administrative efforts to make wilderness candidates available 
for leasing continue. In the last several months, the Forest Service 
announced plans to reevaluate the land covered by RARE 1195 and 
BLM initiated a program to declassify up to 20 percent of the 
wilderness study areas it is protecting pursuant to FLPMA.96 
94. See supra text and note at note 87. 
95. On February 1, 1983 Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Crowell announced plans to 
reevaluate 120 individual units of RARE II in the course of land and resource management 
plans being undertaken by the Forest Service. U.S. Dep't Agriculture Press Release and At-
tachments, February 1, 1983. The review is presented as a response to California v. Block, 690 
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982), which ruled that under NEPA RARE II was inadequate to justify 
allocation of roadless land to non-wilderness with respect to 46 such areas in California. The 
case is a substantial barrier to the commercial use of those RARE II lands categorized as non-
wilderness because it requires further site-specific environmental analysis before those lands 
may officially be treated as non-wilderness. An admitted purpose of the reevaluation an-
nouncement is to encourage Congress to legislatively ratify RARE II's non-wilderness alloca-
tion by declaring it legally adequate under NEP A. Although California v. Block may be con-
fined to its facts and probably also in its holding to the non-wilderness allocation under RARE 
II, the announced reevaluation includes all categories of RARE II land. Thus, the reevaluation 
may also be intended to remove RARE II recommended wilderness and further planning areas 
from their wilderness candidate status. 
96. In December 1982, the Department of the Interior announced a program to delete three 
categories of land from the wilderness study areas previously designated by BLM under 
FLPMA § 603. 47 Fed. Reg. 58,372 (December 30,1982). The three categories are areas under 
5,000 acres, "split-estate lands" (lands where the surface is federally owned but the subsur-
face mineral estate is not), and "contiguous areas" (areas over 5,000 acres which alone lack 
wilderness characteristics but do have wilderness characteristics in association with con-
tiguous designated wilderness or wilderness candidate lands administered by federal agencies 
other than BLM). [d. The action was taken based on a solicitor's opinion and on three decisions 
of the Interior Board of Land Appeals. Memorandum from Solicitor to Sec'y of Interior, 
Review of Interior Board of Land Appeals Decisions on Wilderness Study Areas (December 
15, 1982); Tri-County Cattlemen's Association, 60 IBLA 305 (1981) (areas less than 5,000 
acres); Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 64 IBLA 27 (1982) (split-estate lands); Don Coops, 60 
IBLA 30 (1982) (contiguous areas). These state that the Department lacked the authority to 
treat the three categories as Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) under § 603 of FLPMA. On 
February 3, 1983, the Regional Solicitor for the Department's Northwest Region issued an 
opinion that contradicts this conclusion and stated that the Department "appears to have am-
ple legal authority" to manage 42,000 acres of split-estate lands in California as WSAs. The 
Regional Solicitor was subsequently transferred and all copies of the opinion were ordered 
returned and destroyed. Washington Post, April 2, 1983, at A3, col. 1. 
In announcing this program, the Department simultaneously deleted wilderness study areas 
totalling 667,587 acres consisting of the areas under 5,000 acres and a portion of the split-
estate lands. Fed. Reg. supra. Deletions of the other split-estate lands and the contiguous 
areas are being processed, [d., and one environmental group has estimated that these could 
amount to about two million additional acres. Sierra Club National News Report at 1 & 10 
(December 30, 1982). 
920 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 10:905 
D. NEPA and Other Legal Issues 
The premier legal issue in the wilderness controversy concerns the 
government's compliance with NEP A. NEP A requires that the 
government prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
before undertaking any major federal action that may significantly 
affect the environment.97 Where there is doubt as to whether a 
federal action requires an EIS, the preparation of a Environmental 
Assessment (EA) is required.98 An EA is a smaller version of an EIS 
the purpose of which is to determine whether an action may have 
significant environmental effects and therefore require an EIS.99 
Ultimately, the validity of an EA, as opposed to an EIS, is premised 
on a finding of no significant impact concerning the action under 
consideration. 
In response to increased leasing applications over the last few 
years, the agencies have tended to propose "blanket" leasing of an 
entire National Forest area or other large unit of public land. loo In 
making such a proposal, the agencies frequently admit that virtually 
any substantial oil and gas development of an area will have a signifi-
cant environmental impact. lol Nonetheless, the agencies do not 
precede their leasing decisions with an EIS; instead, they prepare an 
EA.102 These EAs uniformly conclude that stipulations to be at-
tached to the leases will prevent any significant environmental ef-
fects from occurring and that, therefore, an EIS is not required. lOS 
Formally, these conclusions are contained in a "Finding of No 
Significant Impact" (FONSI), a brief document that accompanies the 
EA.104 
NEP A challenges to agency decisions to lease actively dispute the 
validity of the Finding of No Significant Impact in the EA. Such 
In fact, the Department has deleted an additional 325,878 acres from WSA status in Col-
orado, Oregon, and Nevada. 48 Fed. Reg. 11,346-11,347 (Mar. 17, 1983), 12,842-12,842 (Mar. 
28, 1983), 16,129 (Apr. 14, 1983), 16,975 (Apr. 20, 1983). Several environmental groups have 
challenged the action, claiming violations of FLPMA, NEP A and obligations to provide notice 
and comment opportunities. Complaint for Injunction, Declaratory Relief, and/or Mandamus, 
Sierra Club v. Watt, No. S-83-035 (E.D. Cal., filed January 12, 1983). 
97. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C)(v) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 40 C.F.R. SS 1502.3, 1508.3 (1982). 
98. 40 C.F.R. S 1501.3 (1982). 
99. 40 C.F.R. SS 1501.4, 1508.9, 1508.13 (1982). 
100. See, e.g., GREEN MOUNTAIN EA, supra note 17, at 5-7. 
101. See, e.g., CHA'ITAHOOCHEE EA, supra note 15, at 9. 
102. The government has opted to prepare an EIS in connection with proposals to lease in a 
particular area on only two occasions. Those were the two proposals to lease in designated 
wilderness which were announced in 1981 and subsequently abandoned. See supra note 11. 
103. See e.g., CHA'ITAHOOCHEE EA, supra note 15, at iii (third "summary" page). 
104. 40 C.F.R. 5S 1501.4(e), 1508.13 (1982). 
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challenges generally contain at least one of three legal arguments, 
which can be considered sub-issues of the overall NEP A compliance 
issue, that an EIS must be prepared prior to leasing. The first argu-
ment is that the leasing agency, once it has decided to lease, lacks the 
authority to impose and enforce the proposed lease stipulations. If 
the stipulations are unenforceable then they cannot prevent signifi-
cant impact, and so the FONSI cannot be justified. The second argu-
ment is that the stipulations, even if enforceable, are ineffective in 
precluding significant impacts, either in their wording or their ap-
plication. According to this argument, either the soft language of the 
stipulations does not reserve to the agency sufficient control over 
lease activities or the resources requiring protection do not receive 
sufficient protection under the stipulations. The third argument is 
that, even if the stipulations are enforceable and potentially effec-
tive, they may not be implemented in a sufficiently protective man-
ner. This would occur, for example, where a stipulation reserves 
authority to control the timing of drilling but the agency fails to exer-
cise this authority to prevent activity during critical elk calving and 
breeding periods. For convenience, this article refers to these sub-
issues of the overall NEP A issue as the issues of stipulation "en-
forceability," "effectiveness," and "implementation" respec-
tively.lo5 
105. This article focuses largely on the NEPA compliance issue. This issue is only one of 
many intertwined legal issues that the agencies must consider in trying to balance their con-
flicting mandates of oil and gas production and environmental protection. The scope of these 
issues is illustrated by the collective decision that the responsible agencies face when they 
receive a lease application: (1) Do they have to act on it? If so, (2) what duty is there to deny or 
approve the application; and (3) what management standards guide this decision? If they are 
inclined to approve the lease; (4) what restrictions may be put on the lease; and (5) what en-
vironmental analysis is required? These questions correspond to five elements into which the 
legal issues involved can be conveniently divided: (1) the duty to process leases; (2) the authori-
ty to deny leases; (3) land management standards; (4) the authority to restrict lease activity; 
and (5) the NEPA compliance duty. 
The first element, the duty to process leases, concerns the agencies' obligation to act on 
lease applications that are received. It includes the scope of the power to "withdraw" public 
lands altogether from disposition for oil and gas leasing. What constitutes a "withdrawal" is a 
matter of dispute. Recent decisions on this issue are Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 
499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980) (Forest Service failure to process leases on RARE II further 
planning areas constitutes a withdrawal under FLPMA § 204 and is therefore illegal unless ex-
ecuted in compliance with the procedures in FLPMA § 102); Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 
529 F. Supp. 982, clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1981). (Although FLPMA § 204 per-
mits congressional committees to withdraw lands from leasing, the Secretary of the Interior 
may determine the scope and duration of the withdrawal). 
The second element, which is the authority to deny leases, may also be stated as the duty to 
issue leases. This element includes the environmental grounds upon which an agency may deny 
a lease application and the evidence or procedural requisites needed to justify lease denial. For 
example, there is a line of Department of Interior administrative decisions ruling that 
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The implementation issue has not yet been addressed by the 
courts, probably because it presents the plaintiff with the difficult 
evidentiary problem of predicting the defects of future agency 
management. To date, the implementation issue has been raised in 
administrative appeals only.l06 There may be convincing indications 
that an agency will lack the funding, personnel, information, or will-
ingness to use the regulatory power retained through stipulations to 
a degree that prevents significant impacts. l07 Nevertheless, the way 
an agency will use stipulations is a question of what will happen in 
the future and an extremely strong showing on the likelihood of 
weak implementation of stipulations will probably be needed to ob-
tain judicial intervention on such a speculative basis. 
The courts have resolved the enforceability issue in a manner that 
is probably definitive. Specifically, the district court's holding in 
Sierra Club v. Petersonl08 appears to assure the enforceability of 
even the strictest stipulations used by the government, with the 
possible exception of the new contingent rights stipulation. l09 At the 
time of the holding in Peterson, there was a Wyoming District Court 
decision to the contrary, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
Andrus (RMOGA 1).110 RMOGA I indicated that the issuance of a 
lease with stipulations such that the lease ultimately had no develop-
ment rights constituted an unconstitutional "taking," and was con-
trary to congressional intent and unfair to lessees.111 The RMOGA I 
wilderness values alone are an insufficient basis for lease denial. Robert Schulein, 42 LB.L.A. 
54 (1979); Neva H. Henderson, 31LB.L.A. 217 (1977); Stanley M. Edwards, 83 Interior Dec. 
33 (1976); Edras K. Hartley, 23 I.B.L.A. 102 (1975); W. T. Stalls, 18LB.L.A. 34 (1974); Rain-
bow Resources, Inc., 17LB.L.A. 142 (1974). 
A third and closely related element concerns the "land management standards" that dictate 
the goals or principles that must govern agencies decisions for each administrative category of 
public land. For example, FLPMA S 603(c) sets forth two standards, "nonimpairment" and its 
weak sister "no undue degradation" that apply to certain management duties for BLM 
wilderness study areas. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10 CA, 1982), 
rules on when each of these standards applies. 
The authority to restrict lease activity concerns the scope of agency authority to impose and 
enforce stipulations on leases that are issued. Note that this issue, although important in its 
own right, is subsumed in the NEP A sub-issue of whether stipulations are enforceable. 
106. See, e.g., Statement of Reasons (by Vermont Wilderness Assoc., et al., Appellants) at 
9-11, In re: Consent to issuance of oil and gas leases, Green Mountain National Forest (Forest 
Service administrative appeal, filed July 29, 1982). 
107. See, e.g., infra note 243. 
108. 17 ERC at 1453. 
109. The enforceability of the CRS is discussed infra at text and notes at notes 218-21. 
110. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd sub 1W1n. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. 
Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1982). 
111. Id. at 1345. 
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decision was criticized in Peterson112 and has since been reversed by 
the Tenth Circuit in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. 
Watt (RMOGA 1/).113 Since the reversal in RMOGA II was made on 
other grounds, RMOGA rs reasoning conceivably retains some 
viability.114 There is, however, no law contradicting Peterson's deter-
mination that stipulations are enforceable even if they prevent 
development. 
In contrast to the other NEP A sub-issues, the effectiveness issue 
112. 17 ERC at 1453. 
113. RMOGA 1,500 F. Supp. at 1339-43; RMOGA II, 696 F.2d at 738,739. 
114. In RMOGA, an industry group challenged the Interior Department's interpretation of 
§ 603 of the Federal Land Management Policy Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976 & Supp. 
IV 1980). The section directs the Department and then the President to issue recommenda-
tions on whether certain BLM lands with wilderness characteristics are suitable for preserva-
tion as wilderness. It also sets forth two management standards applicable to such "BLM 
wilderness study areas" (WSAs) until Congress acts on the recommendations. The Depart-
ment interpreted the section as making the strict "nonimpairment" management standard the 
norm for all oil and gas activity on leases on WSAs. It interpreted the section's grandfather 
clause to apply the less strict "no undue degradation" standard only to those activities actually 
occurring on the 1976 enactment date of FLPMA. The Department thus applied the stricter 
standard to all post FLPMA leases and all post-FLPMA activities on pre-FLPMA leases. The 
plaintiff argued, and the district court agreed, that the lesser standard applied to all oil and gas 
activity and particularly to all pre-FLPMA leases. The district court interpreted the nonim-
pairment standard to divest affected leases of development rights. The court's reasoning was 
based on statutory interpretation, constitutional standards, and fairness rationales for such an 
effect on leases. See supra text and notes at notes 110-14. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the Department's interpretation of 
the activities to be managed under each management standard. Its rationale was plirely one of 
statutory interpretation. The court did not address District Judge Kerr's interpretation of the 
nonimpairment standard's effect on leases or reach his ruling on such effect's illegality. Thus, 
despite the reversal, Judge Kerr's arguments on the illegality of restrictions that divest leases 
of development rights were not specifically disapproved. They would not be barred by res 
judicata from subsequent suits, such as one challenging the denial of a drilling permit applica-
tion. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that rejection of those arguments may not be im-
plicit in the Tenth Circuit's holding in RMOGA II. The court simply did not need to address 
them. Specifically, it is not clear that the nonimpairment standard will necessarily divest 
lessees of development rights. First, the agency may determine that some degree of develop-
ment does not impair wilderness suitability. Moreover, as the Tenth Circuit observed, since 
Congress may release WSAs from wilderness consideration, WSA status may only be a tem-
porary and brief hiatus from mineral development. RMOGA II, 13 ELR at 20044. Finally, as 
the Tenth Circuit also observed, the Interior Department under the current administration has 
altered its predecessor's interpretation of S 603 with respect to activities begun in the post-
FLPMA period on pre-FLPMA leases. The Department's new position is that although the 
nonimpairment standard applies to such activities, the standard's application must be limited 
by the requirement in FLPMA S 701(h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), that "[alII 
actions ... under this act shall be subject to valid existing rights." See RMOGA 11,13 ELR at 
20043 n.17. Since the nonimpairment standard does not necessarily terminate development 
rights, the Tenth Circuit was not obliged to address Judge Kerr's arguments on the legality of 
"shell leases." The failure to address them does not disapprove them. 
924 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:905 
is very much alive. A challenge on this issue was raised and rejected 
in Sierra Club v. Peterson, along with the enforceability issue. In 
Peterson, however, the court's rationale for rejecting the effec-
tiveness argument was weaku5 and the plaintiffs chose to appeal 
specifically on this issue to the D.C. Circuit.u6 
The current administration's efforts to lease in designated 
wilderness have been stymied, at least for the moment. The ad-
ministration, however, continues to lease in wilderness candidate 
areas. It undertakes such leasing using the EA approach, which 
characterizes leasing as environmentally insignificant, rather than 
the EIS approach, which mandates the thorough and comprehensive 
identification of each proposal's likely environmental impacts and 
possible alternatives. The Sierra Club v. Peterson appeal is signifi-
cant because it addresses directly whether the stipulations underly-
ing the EA approach to leasing are effective in precluding significant 
impacts. The outcome will likely determine whether the agencies 
may continue to consider millions of acres of potential wilderness 
under this leasing approach. 
III. THE PALISADES CASE, Sierra Club v. Peterson 
The Palisades Further Planning Area is a rugged mountainous 
area straddling the Targhee National Forest in Idaho and the 
Bridger-Teton National Forest in Wyoming. The proposal consid-
ered by the Forest Service in its EA was the leasing of the bulk of the 
Further Planning Area using a variety of stipulations.117 Specifical-
ly, the EA identified as "Highly Environmentally Sensitive (HES) 
Areas" all lands with slopes steeper than 40 percent and applied to 
them a Conditional No Surface Occupancy (NSO) Stipulation. us The 
Conditional NSO Stipulation provides that no drilling activ-
115. See infra text and notes at notes 133-35. 
116. Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 82-1695 (D.C. Cir. appeal docketed August 19, 1982). 
Unlike the PALISADES EA, supra note 48, many recent EAs do not detail the stipulations 
that particular areas will receive but merely state in a general way that protective stipulations 
will be applied as necessary. See infra text and note at note 248; CHATTAHOOCHgE EA, supra 
note 15. This lack of specificity strengthens the effectiveness argument, since a leasing pro-
posal arguably cannot be determined to have no significant impacts before a decision has been 
made on what stipulations are to be applied to each area. 
117. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1449; PALISADES EA, supra note 48. 
118. According to the EA and the district court, the HES designation was aJso applied to 
important habitat areas for threatened or endangered species and areas with unique plant or 
animal species or significant cultural resources. [d.; Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1453 
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ity will be allowed on the areas covered unless a subsequent decision 
with appropriate environmental analysis determines otherwise.u9 
Areas that did not receive the stipulation received the Standard Sur-
face Disturbance Stipulation and the Further Planning Area Stipula-
tion. These "non-NSO stipulations" state that drilling may not pro-
ceed until environmental analysis has been done.120 They also retain 
for the government an indeterminate amount of control over the 
time, plac.e, and manner of drilling and other surface activities.12l 
Since the Conditional NSO stipulation was applied to 80 percent of 
the leased area, many of the areas with the non-NSO stipulations ex-
ist as isolated parcels surrounded by NSO acreage.122 A map of the 
leases shows a "sea" of NSO acreage dotted with scattered 
"islands" of non-NSO acreage.123 As in other leasing decisions, the 
EA for the Palisades Further Planning Area contained a Finding of 
No Significant Impacts (FONSI), relying on the stipulations to 
preclude any possible environmental impacts.124 In challenging the 
FONSI, the Sierra Club in Peterson argued that the lease stipula-
tions were unenforceable and, even if enforceable, were ineffective 
in precluding impacts. 
A. The District Court Decision 
In Sierra Club v. Peterson,125 the District Court for the District of 
Columbia upheld a determination by the Department of the Interior 
and the Forest Service that leasing the bulk of the 247,000-acre 
Palisades Further Planning Area does not require an EIS because 
stipulations attached to the leases preclude any significant en-
vironmental impacts. Sierra Club v. Peterson establishes the en-
forceability of the stipulations being used under the government's 
EA approach to wilderness leasing and, unless reversed on appeal, 
n.4. However, the plaintiffs alleged that the slope gradient was the only criterion used since 
NSO stipulations allegedly were not applied to habitat for bald eagle, an endangered species. 
Sierra Club's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 35, Sierra Club v. 
Peterson, 17 ERC 1449 [hereinafter cited as Sierra Club's Palisades Memorandum]. 
119. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC 1449, 1453. For simplicity, Conditional No Surface 
Occupancy Stipulations will be referred to as NSO stipulations in this article. 
120. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC 1449, 1453. 
121. Brief of the Appellant Sierra Club at 3, Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 82-1695 (D.C. Cir. 
appeal docketed August 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Palisades Appellant's Brief]. 
122. Sierra Club's Palisades Memorandum, supra note 118, at 38-39. 
123. PALISADES EA, supra note 48. 
124. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1452-53. 
125. 17 ERC 1449 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1695 (D.C. Cir. August 
19, 1982). 
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the legality of that approach to leasing. The district court decision re-
jected arguments by the Sierra Club on the NEP A sub-issues of the 
enforceability and the effectiveness of the stipulations. The case is 
currently on appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court on the effectiveness 
question only.126 This section discusses Judge Robinson's opinion in 
Sierra Club v. Peterson and reviews the arguments on appeal. It 
then presents some important decisional criteria and projects possi-
ble outcomes and implications of the case. 
1. The Enforceability Issue 
On the enforceability issue, the district court held that the 
Secretary of the Interior had broad authority to place conditions on 
leases and that, therefore, the stipulations were enforceable. The 
court cited Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. 
Berklund,127 which provided a statutory rationale for the en-
forceability of stipulations. Berklund held that the Secretary's 
already broad authority under the Mineral Leasing Act12S to condi-
tion leases to serve the public interest must be construed in light of 
NEPA's instruction to interpret and administer laws in accordance 
with NEP A policies to the fullest possible extent.129 Berklund ruled 
that this broad authority to set lease terms empowered the govern-
ment to set lease terms to protect the environment even where such 
terms would render development commercially impracticable. In ad-
dition to reaffirming the Berklund rationale, Judge Robinson's 
reasoning in Peterson relied on a simple contract principle. The court 
noted that the lessees had agreed to the stipulations and that basic 
contract law allowed the lessees to contract knowingly to conditions 
that eventually might prevent them from exploring or developing 
the lease.1so 
In reaching these conclusions, Judge Robinson rejected contrary 
arguments that underlay the then-standing Wyoming District Court 
decision in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. Andrus 
(RMOGA I),1S1 which has since been reversed on other grounds. In 
126. Palisades Appellant's Brief, supra note 121, at 3. 
127. 458 F. Supp. 925, 937 (D.D.C. 1978) affd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
128. 30 U.S.C. S 187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
129. 42 U.S.C. S 4332 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
130. 17 ERC at 1453. It is doubtful that the court's holding could stand on the contract ra-
tionale alone since an agency must not exceed its statutory authority when entering into a con-
tract. 
131. 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 
November 30, 1982). 
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RMOGA I, Judge Kerr had reasoned that leases which do not even-
tuate in the right to develop are contrary to the normal understand-
ing of the term "lease" and that issuing such "shell leases" offends 
congressional intent in authorizing the issuance of leases. According 
to the court, such action also is unfair to lessees because it makes 
them pay for an entitlement called a "lease" which might ultimately 
be useless. Finally, inRMOGA I Judge Kerr held that the issuance of 
a lease which ultimately has no development rights constitutes an 
unconstitutional "taking."132 In Peterson, Judge Robinson explicitly 
rejected this constitutional holding and implicitly disapproved the 
other aspects of the RMOGA I holding. Judge Robinson's focus on 
the contract aspect of the transaction emphasizes that the lessee is 
essentially paying for an exclusive preference as the developer of a 
tract and accepts the terms for actual development at his peril. 133 An 
analogy could be made to the purchase of land by a developer willing 
to assume the risk of not obtaining the zoning authorization that his 
plans require. 
2. The Effectiveness Issue 
On the effectiveness issue, the Peterson court concluded that the 
stipulations would be effective in preventing significant impact from 
occurring. Its rationale is unconvincing, however. The ruling is 
premised in part on the court's apparent misapprehension that 
Sierra Club had conceded that the stipulations, if enforced, would 
reduce the impacts of the lease issuance to a level of insignificance. 
Perhaps the court was confused on this point, since the Sierra Club 
actively argued the opposite.134 The other rationale for this holding 
may be found in the cryptic statement that "the stipulations may 
prevent development but following the appropriate environmental 
analysis under NEPA, development may occur."135 The deficiencies 
132. [d. at 1345. 
133. 17 ERC at 1453. The Peterson facts addressed by Judge Robinson involve restrictions 
known to the lessee at the time of leasing whereas the RMOGA [ facts addressed by Judge 
Kerr also involve restrictions that apply retroactively to leases and not known to lessees when 
they accepted the leases. Specifically, RMOGA [ challenged the application of the statutory 
nonimpairment standard to new development activity on leases already in effect on June 2, 
when the nonimpairment standard was enacted. See supra note 114. Judge Kerr's arguments 
have more appeal with respect to such retroactive restrictions. 
134. Sierra Club's Palisades Memorandum, supra note 118, propounds at length on the inef-
fectiveness ofthe stipulations. [d. at 9-11. "[T]here is no basis on which to conclude that any of 
the chosen stipulations, when applied to the lands within a particular leasehold, will function to 
prevent damage to the environment .... " [d. at 10. 
135. 17 ERC at 1453. 
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of this statement as support for the court's decision are the focus of 
the pending appeal. 
3. Implications of the Decision 
Although the Sierra Club "lost" on the enforceability issue, the 
decision was really a victory for the Sierra Club because the stipula-
tions were declared enforceable. The stipulations would clearly be 
useless for protecting the environment if they turned out to be unen-
forceable. In effect, the lawsuit seeks at least one of two remedies as 
its goal: strong lease stipulations or preparation of an EIS. These 
alternative remedies reflect an argument that either an EIS should 
be performed or the leases should not commit irrevocably to develop-
ment in the first place. The environmental significance of the two ap-
proaches can be compared. Following the EA approach, 
strong stipulations ensure agency power to regulate development. 
Nevertheless, the very act of leasing may amount to an economic or 
political commitment to development even though structured not to 
be a legal commitment. Leasing also authorizes prospecting, which, 
if successful, creates greater development pressure.136 An advan-
tage of the EIS approach is the delay of the leasing decision, perhaps 
until protective legislation is passed or a more protective administra-
tion takes office. An EIS also alerts Congress and the Executive to a 
proposal,137 generates public attention, and allows public participa-
tion,138 all of which may facilitate a more protective decision. Most 
important, an EIS forces an agency to admit the impacts of its pro-
posal and identify alternatives. 
Thus, both the substantive safeguards of strong stipulations and 
the procedural safeguards of EIS preparation have protective poten-
tial. Because the efficacy of both depends ultimately on their respec-
tive application by the agencies, they should be regarded as com-
plementary lIather than mutually exclusive protective devices. 
B. The Effectiveness Issue on Appeal 
Since enforceable stipulations serve to protect environmental con-
cerns in lease areas, the Sierra Club's appeal of the district court's 
136. In general, there will be much more pressure to permit development on a given area 
once seismic surveys indicate the presence of valuable deposits than prior to such surveys. 
137. NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 938 n.22 (D.D.C. 1978), aiI'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (1982). 
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decision does not contest the holding on the enforceability issue. In-
stead, the appeal is confined to the effectiveness issue and, 
specifically, to the question of the effectiveness of the stipulations on 
the 20 percent of leased land that did not receive a Conditional No 
Surface Occupation (NSO) Stipulation.1s9 The thrust of the appeal is 
that the stipulations (other than the Conditional NSO Stipulation) 
fail to retain for the agency the authority to prevent a lessee from 
drilling, and that this deficiency prevents the stipulations from 
guaranteeing that no significant impacts may occur. Accordingly, 
since there may be significant impacts, an EIS is required.140 This 
argument presents two questions that may be discussed sequential-
ly: (1) whether non-NSO leases by their nature convey firm develop-
ment rights; and, if so, (2) whether the development so authorized 
may have significant impacts which require that an EIS be prepared. 
1. Are Development Rights Assured? 
The basic government oil and gas lease without any stipulations 
grants the lessee a right to develop any oil and gas deposits on the 
leased tract.141 Unless qualified by stipulations, the lease divests the 
government of the authority to prevent development.142 In the 
absence of stipulations, government action which did prevent 
development would likely constitute a compensable breach of con-
tract14S or a "taking." 144 By applying stipulations to leases, however, 
the government may limit the rights it conveys to lessees and 
reserve for itself a degree of control over lease activities. 145 Since the 
Conditional No Surface Occupancy Stipulation clearly states that the 
surface of the lease area may not be occupied,146 it retains for the 
139. Palisades Appellant's Brief, supra note 121, at 2. 
140. [d. 
141. The lessee is granted the exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, 
remove and dispose of all the oil and gas deposits ... in the lands leased, together 
with the right to construct and maintain thereupon, all works, buildings, plants, 
waterways, roads, or other structures necessary to the full enjoyment thereof ... 
Dep't of the Interior Lease form 3110-1, p. 2, section 1 (March 1977). 
142. [d. The oil and gas lease is a contract determinative of the rights and obligations of 
both parties to the contract. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978). The 
lessee receives "a property right enforceable against the government." Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. 
Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1975). 
143. See supra note 142. 
144. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d at 747-49. 
145. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1453; NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. at 937. 
146. Federal Defendants' Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 32, Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC 1449 [hereinafter 
cited as Federal Defendants' Palisades Statement]. 
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government the right to prevent activity on the lease altogether. The 
Sierra Club's appeal, therefore, does not contest the Finding of No 
Significant Impact in the Palisades EA with respect to such stipula-
tions. 
In contrast, the non-NSO stipulations such as the Standard Sur-
face Disturbance Stipulation, and the Further Planning Area 
Stipulation, may not retain for the government a right to prevent ac-
tivity. They reserve some ability to control the time, place, and man-
ner of development activity, but their language is permissive in 
nature, and the degree of control retained is unresolved. Non-NSO 
stipulations do state that further environmental analysis will be re-
quired before drilling is permitted. But if the authority to actually 
prevent development effectively has been given away at the leasing 
stage, the agency may find itself unable to prevent significant im-
pacts when it reaches 'the drilling stage.147 In brief, the agency will 
find itself trying to lock "the barn door after the horses have already 
been stolen."148 
While the federal government has avoided addressing this line of 
reasoning directly, its apparent position is that it retains authority to 
prevent development only on areas covered by NSO Stipulations. 
Specifically, it states that the Conditional NSO Stipulation reserves 
authority to prevent development, but when discussing the other 
stipulations the government claims only that it has the power to 
regulate the time, place, and manner of activity. 149 Thus, the govern-
ment effectively concedes that it does not retain the power to 
preclude development on acreage not covered by NSO stipulations. 
Once this flaw in the government's position is acknowledged, there 
are two ways of viewing its reasoning and the EA approach to leas-
ing. The cynical view is that it is trying to cover a spurious finding of 
no significant impact by asserting that major surface activities can-
not occur without a subsequent authorizing decision and attendant 
environmental analysis. This obfuscates the fact that the subsequent 
"decision" can only be one that authorizes development. The more 
generous view is that the government admits it cannot prevent 
development on the non-NSO areas but has determined that the im-
pacts of development on these areas would not be significant since 
they amount to only 20 percent of the leased area and can be 
147. Reply Brief of the Appellant Sierra Club at 9-10, Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC 1449 
[hereinafter cited as Palisades Appellant's Reply Brief]. 
148. Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262, 266 (W.D. Wash. 1971), affd in pvrrt, 455 F.2d 
1111 (9th Cir. 1972). 
149. Federal Defendants' Palisades Statement, supra note 146, at 32. 
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regulated to a degree. The problem with this view is that the govern-
ment has failed to specify the scope of the rights being granted or 
powers being retained under the non-NSO stipulations in the first 
place. As a consequence, the EA fails to describe what impacts may 
be expected under the non-NSO stipulations or to articulate why 
these impacts are not significant. 
When viewed in light of the above analysis, Judge Robinson's ra-
tionale for finding the stipulations effective is inadequate. The court 
stated that "both sides concede [the stipulations] may prevent 
development."15o While this is true for the Conditional NSO Stip-
ulations, no litigant took the position that the other stipulations may 
prevent development. 151 The court also wrote that "the stipulations 
may prevent development but following the appropriate en-
vironmental analysis under NEPA, development may occur."152 
Perhaps the court intended this as an interpretation of the stipula-
tions. That is, after examining the language of the stipulations and 
the law governing them, the court was ruling that the non-NSO 
stipulations do reserve authority to prevent development. Since 
neither party took this position and since there is no analysis of the 
stipulation language by the court, this seems unlikely. More likely, 
the court was simply referring to its finding that the later en-
vironmental analysis excused the absence of an EIS at the current 
stage, without reflecting on the commitment to development in-
herent in leasing which would be irrevocable by the time the later 
analysis was performed. 
This fundamental issue in Peterson is illuminated by a line of cases 
enunciating what could be called the "irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment" doctrine. Their principle is that when a project may 
have significant impacts an EIS must be prepared before the action 
authorizing the project.15S Two related mining cases illustrate this 
principle. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Berklund154 
held that an EIS must be prepared before the issuance of coal pref-
150. 17 ERC at 1453. 
151. See supra text and notes at notes 134, 149. 
152. 17 ERC at 1453. 
153. NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. at 238-39; EDF v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 852 (9th 
Cir. 1979); Nat'l Forest Preservation Group V. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1973); Califor-
nia ex rei. Younger V. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 16,92 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The phrase "irreversible 
and irretrievable commitment of resources" is derived from NEPA § 102 (2)(C)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 
4332 (2)(C)(v) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), but is not used there as the standard for when the EIS 
requirement is triggered. It nevertheless has been used by these courts to illustrate the stand-
ard for when an EIS is required. 
154. 458 F. Supp. at 237-39. 
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erence right leases which might have significant impacts and that 
the EIS may not be delayed until the lessees submit mining plans. 
Lease issuance was ruled an "irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ment of resoures" requiring the preparation of an EIS. In eontrast, 
Sierra Club v. Hathaway166 held that issuance of geothermal 
resources leases was not an "irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ment" of resources requiring a prior EIS because it entitled lessees 
only to limited and environmentally insignificant exploration ac-
tivities. 
This line of cases also demonstrates a corollary to this timing prin-
ciple: the decision on whether an EIS is required must consider the 
impacts of the entire activity actually authorized.166 Nevertheless, 
the cases determine what has actually been authorized only in a 
rough, practical sense.167 These cases did not determine the extent 
to which the government was legally committed to allow develop-
ment. The Peterson appeal is animated by the question of what ac-
tivity has been "authorized" in a strict legal sense.16S This is a key 
question, one neglected by Judge Robinson and, apparently, by the 
courts in the above line of cases. 
On this question of timing, the government in the Peterson appeal 
urges that an EIS is not necessary presently because there is "no 
'significant action of known dimensions' "169 and more thorough 
analysis at this point is not" 'meaningfully possible.' "160 While it is 
true that the oil potential of the Palisades area is presently 
speculative, there is no reason why the government cannot specify 
those activities to which it is committed under the non-NSO stipUla-
tions or what the environmental effects of such activities would 
155. 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978). 
156. This corollary explains, for example, the difference in outcomes between Berklund and 
Hathaway. Both cases concern the need for a pre·leasing EIS in relation to a type of develop-
ment that can presumably have significant impacts when undertaken on a large scale. The 
Hathaway geothermal leases were found to actually authorize only preliminary prospecting ac-
tivities with insignificant impacts, whereas the Berklund leases represented an after-
prospecting authorization which made a commitment to development. 
157. In Berklund, for example, the court considered the leases to authorize, or at least to 
commit to development, without looking at the question of whether the leases legally obligated 
the agency to approve subsequent mining plans that precede actual development. The question 
of what the leases committed to as a legal rather than as a practical manner was missed, 
despite the agency's statement that it was permitted by regulation to reject mining plans that 
were unsatisfactory environmentally. 458 F. Supp. at 930. 
158. See, e.g., Palisades Appellants' Brief, supra note 65, at 23-27. 
159. Brief for the Federal Appellees at 32, Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 82-1H95 (D.C. Cir. 
appeal docketed, August 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Palisades Federal Appellees' Brief] 
(quoting Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1978». 
160. Id. (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Appalachian Reg'l Comm'n, 677 F'.2d 883, 889 
(1981». 
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be.161 More important, NEP A requires an EIS prior to an ir-
revocable commitment of resources regardless of the difficulty of 
predicting a project's future. 162 
The agencies' determination that the proposed leasing does not 
commit to any environmentally significant activities is at odds with 
their position in other cases. For example, in the "Little Granite 
Creek" case, Sierra Club v. Chase,163 currently before the federal 
district court in Wyoming, the government argues that it committed 
itself to permitting development when it issued stipulated leases on 
the Gros Ventre recommended wilderness area. The set of stipula-
tions used in Little Granite Creek are comparable to the non-NSO 
stipulations in the Palisades. Both sets of stipulations on their face 
retain authority to regulate development but not to prevent it. In 
Chase, the Sierra Club is challenging the issuance of drilling permits 
on leases issued in 1969. BLM asserts that it is bound by the terms of 
the lease and stipulations to issue such permits, regardless of its 
assessment of the environmental damage involved.164 From this it 
can be seen that agency policy is inconsistent as it concerns the 
significance of non-NSO leasing. At the leasing stage the agencies 
say such leases make no irrevocable commitment and so require no 
EIS. But at the drilling permit stage when an EIS may be required, 
the agencies say that they irrevocably committed to development 
when the leases were issued.166 
There are a number of reasons why it is particularly urgent for the 
Court of Appeals to define the scope of the rights granted and 
authority retained under non-NSO stipulations. First, as the Chase 
situation illustrates, the agencies take an inconsistent position on the 
issue in a way that enables them to avoid NEP A compliance 
161. See infra text and notes at notes 253-55. 
162. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975) ("That the exact type of 
development is not known is not an excuse for failing to file an impact statement at ail. Uncer-
tainty about the pace and direction of development merely suggests the need for exploring in 
the [EIS] alternative scenarios based on these external contingencies"); Envt'l Defense Fund 
v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1979). 
163. No. C82-0411 (D. Wyo. filed Oct. 7, 1982). 
164. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Sierra Club v. Chase, No. 
C82-0411 (D. Wyo. filed Oct. 7, 1982). BLM's position in that case was based upon a legal opin-
ion prepared in response to operating proposals for Little Granite Creek and vicinity. Opinion 
of the Acting Regional Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Oct. 10, 1980). The legal opinion 
has been repudiated by the Department of the Interior in the course of the Peterson and 
RMOGA litigation. 
165. The opinion is one of a number of opinions and regulations indicating that the agencies 
regard lease issuance as an irretrievable commitment to a mineral development proposal and 
the point at which an EIS should be prepared. Opinion of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of Interior 
(October 5, 1981); 516 D.M. 4.3d, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,546 (April 23, 1980). 
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altogether. Under the EA approach to leasing, by the time that 
specific environmental analysis through an EIS is to be undertaken, 
agencies may not prepare an EIS because they have divested all 
discretion. The Little Granite Creek situation in Chase must be 
avoided. Second, as the Interior Department preaches but does not 
practice, policies of fairness to lessees and economic efficiency re-
quire that the reserved right of the government to prevent beneficial 
use of the lease, if any, be made "crystal clear" at the outset.166 
Third, this issue represents the crux of a number of court and ad-
ministrative challenges of contested leasing decisions like the 
Palisades,167 which must be resolved in the near future. Finally, it is 
impossible for meaningful environmental analysis on leasing pro-
posals to occur unless the effect of non-NSO stipulations has been 
defined. As the next section discusses, a finding of no significant im-
pact cannot be meaningful if the effect of the stipulations is indeter-
minate. 
2. May Development have Significant Effects? 
Assuming that non-NSO leases commit to some degree of develop-
ment, the question arises whether that development may be signifi-
cant. This issue has not been given a "hard 100k"168 by the agencies 
or by the district courts. In Peterson, the agency rested its no impact 
finding on the legal conclusion that the possibility of later en-
vironmental analysis at the drilling permit stage obviated the need 
for an EIS before leasing.169 The EA itself did not describe the scope 
of development authorized or the impacts that might result. Similar-
ly, the district court's determination was made on the simple legal 
presumption that the stipulations could prevent development. The 
court did so without looking at the extent of development authorized 
by the lease and its possible impacts. This judicial deference com-
plicates the Peterson appeal. The appellate court would seem to lack 
the factual basis necessary to reach determination on the validity of 
the no significant impacts conclusion. 
The Palisades EA described the impacts of full development, that 
is, leasing without stipulations, but it did not describe the impacts of 
the proposed action, which is leasing with stipulations.17° The prac-
166. Chevron Oil Co., 24 IBLA 159, 160 (1976). 
167. See supra note 90 (cases and administrative actions cited). 
168. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (environmental analysis must take 
a "hard look" at environmental consequences). 
169. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1452-53. 
170. PALISADES EA, supra note 48, at 36-47. 
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tical effect of this omission is to enable the agencies to avoid describ-
ing the environmental consequences of the actual activities that it ir-
revocably authorizes. 
This overall deficiency in the EA itself arguably constitutes a 
NEPA violation quite apart from whether the EA's no impact con-
clusion is in some technical sense "correct." Specifically, an EA 
which does not describe the scope of developments violates the re-
quirement that an EA describe the impacts of any "proposed action," 
as required by the primary NEPA regulations. l71 EAs have been 
struck down for neglecting this duty to describe, albeit without 
specific reference to the NEPA regulations,172 and the duty would 
seem to be intrinsic in the D.C. Circuit's stated requirement in Peter-
son that EAs take a "hard look" at a proposal's impacts.173 
The deficiency has not prevented the government from proposing 
several reasons why the development should be considered insignifi-
cant. First, it notes that, statistically, drilling takes place on only a 
small percentage of all leases issued.174 This argument is circular. It 
urges that authorizing development should not be considered signifi-
cant because lessees will probably not use their authorization. It ig-
nores the possibility that a valuable field will be discovered and many 
leases therefore developed. Second, the government argues that im-
pacts can be mitigated or "reclaimed." For example, it recites some 
of the limitations that the non-NSO stipulations can impose on activi-
ty, such as requiring the best available drilling technology or curtail-
ing operations during calving and fawning seasons.175 The approach 
is also spurious because it makes the conclusory statement that since 
the non-NSO areas have not been classified as "Highly Environ-
mental Sensitive Areas," they are, "by definition, not incapable of 
being rehabilitated if any damage is caused."176 Such arguments 
sidestep the EA's fundamental failure to even list the impacts that 
might occur.l77 
171. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1509.9 (a)(l) & (b). 
172. Foundation for N. Am. Wilderness Sheep v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 681 F .2d 1172, 
1178-80 (9th Cir. 1982). 
173. Sierra Club V. Peterson, 17 ERC at 1452. 
174. Palisades Federal Appellees' Brief, supra note 159, at 26. 
175. [d. at 30. 
176. [d. at 28. 
177. At the appellate oral argument there was some discussion of the bearing of the size and 
location of the acreage with non-NSO stipulations on the question of the significance of possi-
ble environmental impacts. (Author attended hearing). The non-NSO acreage is approximately 
28,000 acres (43 square miles) or about 20 percent of the leased acreage. While some of the 
non-NSO acreage is at the edge of the Palisades FPA along a road, most is on parcels within 
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C. The Standard of Review on Appeal: 
The Word UMay" and the Arbitrary and Capricious 
Standard of Review 
An agency determination that an EIS is not required is subject to 
the so-called "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial 
review.178 In addition, whether there may be significant impacts 
generally is a factual question, committed to agency discretion and 
subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.179 Under 
this standard a court must defer to any reasonable interpretation of 
the facts by the agency. The existence of another reasonable inter-
pretation contrary to that of the agency is not grounds for reversal. 
The deference inherent under this standard of review has an in-
teresting interaction with the word u may" in the NEP A require-
ment of an EIS for any major federal action that may significantly 
affect the environment. Although the word "may" does not occur in 
the language of the NEP A section dictating the EIS requirement, 
the primary NEP A regulations have interpreted the section to re-
quire an EIS when a proposal "may affect" the environment.18o This 
reading has been upheld by the courts.181 If the operative language 
the FPA. PALISADES EA, supra note 48, at A-15. Development, particularly roads and 
pipelines, of such interior tracts will obviously affect other acreage. 
178. There is a split in the circuits over the standard of review for agency findings that an 
EIS is not required. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is used in the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); First 
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973). A "reasonableness" 
standard is used in the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Save Our Ten Acres v. 
Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 
F.3d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); City of Davis v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyoming 
Outdoor Coordinator's Council v. Butz, 484 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). This article uses the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard for its analysis and concludes that a court has substantial free-
dom to intervene. This conclusion also would hold under the reasonableness standard which, 
because it is a stricter standard, Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466, gives at least as much 
freedom to intervene. The arbitrary and capricious standard apparently is the standard in the 
D.C. Circuit, where the Palisades case is being heard, although this is not entirely clear, and 
the court may even equate the two standards. See Cabinet Mountain Wilderness/Scotman's 
Park Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678,681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1982); People Against Nuclear 
Energy v. NRC, No. 81-1131, slip op. at 26 (D.C. Cir. May 14,1982); Comm. for Auto Respon-
sibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992,1002-1003 (1979); Maryland-National Capital Park and Plan-
ning Comm'n v. U.S. Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter 
cited as MNCPPCj. 
179. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974). 
180. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.3. 
181. Found. for N. Am. Wild. Sheep v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1177-78 
(9th Cir. 1982); Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585,597 (9th 
Cir. 19); City & County of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1980); 
City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,673 (9th Cir. 1975); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 
472 F .2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973). The cases indicate that an EIS is necessary whenever a proj-
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of the EIS requirement were' 'whenever a proposal will have (or will 
likely have) significant impact," then the agency's determination of 
the scenario of environmental impacts that would occur would be en-
titled to deference as long as it were reasonable. The require-
ment of an EIS "whenever a proposal may have significant impact" 
puts an additional duty on the agency, that of considering alternative 
scenarios.182 Since the question posed by "may" is not whether 
significant impacts will occur but whether significant impacts are 
possible,183 the agency is required to consider not only the scenario it 
expects most but also alternative scenarios. Merely evaluating the 
impact of the scenario it expects does not entitle an agency to 
deference. The existence of a major unconsidered scenario with 
significant impacts is grounds for overruling the agency.184 An agen-
cy is not required to consider every conceivable scenario a challenger 
may present, and is entitled to deference in deciding what is likely 
enough to require consideration. Nonetheless, theoretically there 
must be some point at which a scenario with significant impacts is 
sufficiently likely to occur that the agency must consider it. 185 
In Peterson, the agency considered the impacts of the scenario in 
which the stipulations it imposed are effective to preclude develop-
ment. It failed to consider the impacts of the scenario in which its 
stipulations cannot preclude development. The court, therefore, is 
entitled to overrule the agency if it determines that the scenario of 
ineffective stipulations may have significant impact and is likely 
enough that the agency should have considered it. The question of 
how likely this scenario is depends in turn on the court's interpreta-
tion of the stipulations. This is a purely legal question. Its integration 
into what might otherwise be a purely factual inquiry is the agency's 
doing. That is, the agency chose to structure its proposal and 
analysis so that its finding of no significant impact rests on the legal 
question of the stipulations' effectiveness. The court is entitled to 
ect "may cause a significant degradation of some human evironmental factor." Save Our Ten 
Acres, 472 F.2d at 467. The Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to indicate that an EIS is 
necessary whenever "the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show that the proposed proj-
ect may significantly degrade some human environmental factor." Columbia Basin, 643 F.2d 
at 597 (emphasis in original). 
182. The agency's duty to consider alternative scenarios is stated in City of Davis v. Cole-
man, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
183. Found. for N. Am. Wild. Sheep, 681 F .2d at 1178 (" A determination that significant ef-
fects on the human environment will infact occur is not essential" (emphasis in original». 
184. ld. at 1172. 
185. It would be nearly impossible for any finding of no significant impact to stand if EAs 
were required to consider every remotely possible impact of a proposal. 
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make an independent judgment on this question.186 It is not a factual 
question in which the agency's discretion prevails/87 or a matter of 
statutory construction for which agencies also receive some 
deference;188 rather, it involves the interpretation of a contract be-
tween the government and a lessee. In summary, the word "may" in 
the EIS requirement subjects the agency to reversal for failure to 
consider a likely scenario with potentially significant impaets; the 
likelihood of the scenario should be determined by the court's in-
dependent assessment of the effectiveness of the stipulations In 
precluding development. 
D. Possible Outcomes on Appeal 
The D.C. Circuit's decision in this case likely will determine 
whether the government may continue large-scale leasing under the 
EA approach. In this decision, a central issue is whether the non-
NSO stipulations preserve government authority to prevent develop-
ment. 189 A ruling that they do would allow EA leasing to continue, 
but would facilitate wilderness protection by guaranteeing the 
government full power to refuse permission to develop leases.190 The 
stipulations would be certified both as retaining the option of refus-
ing development and, under the lower court's decision, as en-
forceable. This ruling, while not mandating a pre-leasing EIS, would 
"strengthen" leasing stipulations and, as such, would represent a 
victory of sorts for environmentalists.191 If the court instead decides 
that the non-NSO stipulations cannot prevent development, it then 
faces the issue whether significant impacts may occur, the trigger 
186. See supra text and notes at notes 153-65. 
187. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974). 
188. FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1975). 
189. The court conceivably could avoid this issue. For example, it might refuse to upset 
Judge Robinson's finding that the Sierra Club conceded the stipulations' ability to prevent 
significant impact, 17 ERC at 1453. Such a decision would have minimal precedential value. 
The court also could avoid the issue by shaping an opinion around the nebulous four.-factor test 
for evaluating EAs set forth in MNCPPC, 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See 
supra note 179. This would sanction the government's EA approach to leasing. Finally, the 
court could also remand the question of the stipulations' ability to prevent development to the 
district court or even the agency. 
190. Due to the ambiguous nature of the lower court's ruling on effectiveness, it would be 
desirable for the Court of Appeals to make clear the scope of its opinion and the rationale for 
finding that the stipulations retain veto power over future development. 
191. A holding that the non-NSO stipulations retain authority to prevent development 
would be contrary to the argument advanced by the Sierra Club but would serve its interests 
by "strengthening" the stipulations. The lower court's holding that the stipulations are en-
forceable has a similar effect. See supra text and notes at note 135. 
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test for the EIS requirement. There are three chief possibilities here: 
the court could uphold the FONSI, remand for reconsideration of the 
FONSI, or veto the FONS!. 
First, the court could uphold the government's no impact deter-
mination despite finding that development rights are guaranteed 
under non-NSO leases. This holding could only be based on a finding 
that the development rights guaranteed under the stipulations are so 
limited that they lack even the potential for significant environmen-
tal impact. As discussed above,192 the court probably lacks the fac-
tual basis for this conclusion because the Palisades EA never 
described the specific impacts that are possible under the lease condi-
tioned by the non-NSO stipulations. Both the agency and the lower 
court based their determinations on legal presumptions rather than 
factual analysis. This holding would effectively endorse the govern-
ment's current practice of rubber stamping major wilderness leasing 
programs with cursory environmental analysis and boilerplate 
FONSIs. 
Second, the court could rule that development rights are guar-
anteed under the stipulations but avoid further determination by 
remanding the question whether the development guaranteed has 
potential for significant impact. Because the EA did lack the factual 
basis necessary for a no impact determination, it would be more 
reasonable to remand to the agency than to the district court. This 
result amounts to a compromise position. On the one hand, it 
prevents the EA from standing either on an incorrect legal assess-
ment of the stipulations or an inadequate factual assessment of the 
development and resultant impacts they authorize. At the same 
time, it avoids setting a precedent on the acceptability of EAs as 
leasing decision documents. On the other hand, however, the accept-
ability of EAs in general is a key issue being widely litigated193 that 
arguably should be resolved here rather than deferred. 
Third, the court may conclude that because the stipulations cannot 
prevent development they do not necessarily preclude the possibility 
of significant environmental impact. This determination would 
reflect the obvious significance of any development in wilderness in 
general and in wilderness of this size and sensitivity in particular. It 
would also reflect the government's duty to produce an EIS 
whenever significant impact is possible. In the opinion of this writer, 
192. See supra text and notes at notes 168-73. 
193. See supra note 90 (administrative actions and cases cited). 
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the court has an insufficient factual basis to rule that the develop-
ment guaranteed will necessarily be insignificant but the court has 
sufficient legal authority to hold such development significant. Con-
gress' understanding of "significant impact" as the EIS trigger test 
is a statutory interpretation question on which the court is entitled to 
use independent judgment.194 The court, therefore, may require 
preparation of an EIS if it finds that building roads and drilling wells 
in the heart of wilderness is within that understanding. "The spirit 
of [NEPA] would die aborning if the facile, ex parte decision that the 
project ... did not significantly affect the environment were too 
well shielded from impartial review."195 
A determination of significant impact could be limited to the facts 
of the case to allow the possibility of EA leasing under other cir-
cumstances. A no impact result could be permitted, for example, 
where the acreage involved was smaller, the land less fragile, or the 
stipulations more restrictive. Within its scope, a holding striking 
down the FONSI would invalidate the EA approach to large-scale 
wilderness leasing~ The government would then be required either to 
precede major wilderness leasing projects with EISs or to use leases 
lacking guaranteed development rights by attaching NSO stipula-
tions or other restrictive stipulations. One such restrictive stipula-
tion is the Contingent Rights Stipulation which, as an alternative to 
EA and EIS leasing, represents a third approach to leasing. The 
following section discusses the Contingent Rights Stipulation and its 
environmental implications in the context of the issues raised by the 
Peterson appeal. 
IV. THE CONTINGENT RIGHTS STIPULATION 
In mid-1982, the Forest Service adopted a policy of selectively us-
ing a new lease stipulation, the Contingent Rights Stipulation (CRS), 
in order to break the impasse that it had reached in issuing oil and 
gas leases.196 Superficially, the CRS is the strictest possible stipula-
tion because in making all rights contingent it purports to retain for 
the government complete authority to preclude development 
later .197 Because the CRS theoretically does not commit irreversibly 
194. See supra text and notes at notes 153-65, 186. 
195. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973). 
196. CRS Policy Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 18,158 (Apr. 28, 1982) [hereinafter cited as CRS 
Policy Notice]. 
197. Id. Memorandum, Test of a Revised Leasing Process Through Use of a Contingent 
Right Stipulation, to Reg'l Foresters from Forest Service Chief R. Max Peterson at 1 (May 28, 
1982) [hereinafter cited as CRS Policy Directive]. The CRS would appear to be very similar in 
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to development, the Forest Service believes that it requires no en-
vironmental analysis.198 Ultimately, the CRS policy chiefly serves 
the administrative convenience of the Forest Service rather than 
any coherent approach to natural resource use. As a result, it has 
been received with reservation by both industry and environmental 
interests.199 Industry is skeptical of the CRS because it apparently 
does not convey a guaranteed right to drill. 200 Conservationists are 
wary of the CRS because it is used to eliminate pre-leasing en-
vironmental analysis and because its ability to actually protect 
wilderness is unclear. 
A. The CRS Described 
The CRS states that an operating plan for activity on a lease will 
not be approved if the plan will result in unacceptable impacts on 
land uses or on the environment. It states also that the lessee has no 
recourse for compensation, notwithstanding the government's 
failure to approve operating plans.201 These provisions are intended 
to make the government's obligation to allow development complete-
ly discretionary by establishing that disapproval of operating plans 
will not constitute a compensable breach of contract or "taking."202 
The Forest Service believes that leases issued with the CRS do not 
require any initial environmental analysis because the CRS retains 
authority to preclude any development that is environmentally unac-
ceptable. Instead of initial environmental analysis for a whole leasing 
area, the Forest Service plans to perform analysis at the operating 
stage for those leases on which permission to drill is actually 
sought.203 Administratively, the amount of environmental analysis 
effect to a NSO stipulation, since both purportedly retain the right to prevent development. A 
lessee however, presumably would have a greater expectation of being allowed to develop 
under the CRS since the NSO stipulation represents a decision made after environmental 
analysis not to allow surface occupancy whereas CRS leasing amounts to the deferral of both 
environmental analysis and a decision on development. The opposite is true for NSO areas 
located close enough to non-NSO areas to be reached by slant drilling. For such lands the NSO 
stipUlation represents permission to develop in a restricted manner. 
198. Id. 
199. 48 Fed. Reg. 3370 (Jan. 25, 1983). See, e.g., Statement of Reasons at 6-9, In re: USDA 
Forest Service Consent to Issuance of Oil and Gas Leases Hoosier National Forest, Indiana. 
200. CRS Policy Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 18,158 (Apr. 28, 1982). 
201. Id. The CRS also provides that the government may extend the lease for up to five 
years without rental payment when it decides an operating plan cannot be approved. 
202. See supra notes 141-42. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution re-
quires compensation for "takings": "nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. v. 
203. CRS Policy Notice, supra note 196. 
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that the Forest Service performs will be reduced, since operating 
plans are actually submitted for less than 20 percent of leases issued. 
Before the CRS is used, four criteria must be met.204 First, the 
leases must be non-competitive oil and gas or geothermal leases on 
further planning areas or non-wilderness candidate lands. Second, 
there must not be a completed EA or EIS for the area in question. 
Third, there must be information from land management plans or 
other documents sufficient to indicate general resource values but in-
sufficient for lease-specific environmental analysis. Finally, potential 
resource use conflicts must be great enough that considerable ex-
pense will be saved by avoiding pre-leasing environmental analysis, 
but not so great that lease denial is justified for a large proportion of 
tracts. To date, the CRS has been used in at least two areas, 
although none of these areas involve significant wilderness can-
didate land.205 
B. Administrative Implications 
To understand the CRS policy, consider the chicken-and-egg prob-
lem that the Forest Service faces as a land manager trying to design 
a leasing system. It is inconvenient to do environmental analysis 
before an operating proposal is made. An operating proposal cannot 
be made until prospecting has occurred. Companies have little incen-
tive to prospect until they have drilling rights assured. But assured 
drilling rights may not be issued until environmental analysis is per-
formed. There is no perfect solution to this circular situation where 
no step can come first because it ought ideally to be preceded by 
another step. 
There are, however, three imperfect solutions (see figure 1). (1) 
Lease with assured drilling rights, do environmental analysis later. 
This alternative is obviously illegal because it violates NE:P A; it is 
what Sierra Club v. Peterson and similar suits accuse the govern-
ment of doing. (2) Lease without granting assured drilling rights; do 
204. CRS Policy Directive, supra note 197, at 2. 
205. The Forest Service decided to approve CRS leasing for adjoining sections of the Challis 
and Salmon National Forests in Idaho. The acceptance rate for such leases appears to be only 
"bout 10 percent, as only twelve of over 100 CRS leases offered in this area have been ac-
cepted. Telephone interview with Lorrie Meier, Mineral Technician, Mineral Areas Manage-
ment, Region 4 Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture (Apr. 25, 1983). On March 18, 1983, 
the Forest Service rejected an administrative appeal by environmental groups and gave final 
consent to CRS leasing on 150,000 acres in the Hoosier National Forest. Telephone interview 
with Kathy Dolge, Conveyance and Applications Examiner, Minerals Management, Region 9, 
Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture (Apr. 25, 1983). 
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environmental analysis later. This is what the eRS purports to do. 
(3) Do environmental analysis first; lease with assured drilling rights 
later. This is what environmentalists are seeking-a detailed pre-
leasing EIS. 
There is a practical difference between the two "legal" alter-
natives above. In alternative two, the eRS, prospecting precedes en-
vironmental analysis, and in alternative three, the EIS, these steps 
are reversed (see figure 2). As the government's eRS policy claims, 
environmental analysis is wasted if subsequent prospecting results 
prevent a lessee from drilling. The other side of the coin is that 
prospecting is wasted if subsequent environmental analysis prevents 
drilling. In fact, prospecting for oil is extremely expensive. For a 
given tract the cost of preparing even a detailed environmental 
analysis is likely to be small compared to the lessees' collective pros-
pecting costS.206 Because of this cost disparity, it is much cheaper to 
do environmental analysis first and risk wasting that expense (alter-
native three) than the reverse. This rule also holds with respect to 
lands where either investigation will give negative results, because it 
is cheaper to decide not to drill through environmental analysis than 
through prospecting. It is immaterial cost-wise which process occurs 
first on tracts where drilling proposals are approved since both in-
vestigations will give positive results and must precede drilling.207 
206. This will generally be true even where exploratory efforts are abandoned after a low 
level of initial unpromising prospecting. The prospecting costs in a given area tend to be many 
times greater than the cost of pre-lease environmental analysis. For example, a typical range 
of cost for seismic surveying in an environmentally sensitive mountainous region might be 
$15,000 to $25,000 per line mile. Telephone interview with Frank Garrett, Domestic Division 
Manager, Seismograph Contract Co. (December 21, 1982). A frugal geologist might use one 
line mile of seismography per section (640 acres) for an initial survey. Id. Thus, exploration of 
all sections on a single five section, 3200-acre lease might cost $200,000. Typical costs for an 
oil and gas leasing EA (pre-leasing) and for an oil and gas development EIS (operating plan 
stage) might be $35,000 and $350,000, respectively. Telephone interviews with Yvonne 
MacNeil, Environmental Documents Assessor, Forest Service Region 6, and Elena Green, En-
vironmental Analysis Technician, Envt'l Coordination Office, Forest Service (January 12, 
1983). The latter figure probably better represents the cost of detailed analysis that this article 
advocates for the pre-lease stage. Thus, the $200,000 cost for a frugal but thorough seismic 
survey of a single 3200-acre lease is in the neighborhood of the $350,000 cost for a detailed EIS 
for an entire administrative area of 100,000 to 500,000 acres. 
207. This analysis assumes that environmental analysis and prospecting are independent 
decisionmaking processes. It also assumes that industry will accept CRS leases and prospect 
under them. If this assumption is false then CRS leasing is equivalent to not leasing at ali. 
Finally, it is also assumed that the government will actually use the CRS to prevent develop-
ment where its effects are environmentally unacceptable despite favorable prospecting 
results. Of course, if this assumption is false the CRS is nothing more than a device to avoid 
NEPA. 
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In fact, BLM's recent decision that the CRS will be used only at the 
lease applicant's option makes the likelihood of any agency cost sav-
ings extremely dubious. This new policy gives the lease applicant the 
option of refusing an offered CRS without losing his priority as the 
first or lottery-selected applicant.208 He may simply wait until the 
agency completes an environmental analysis document and offers a 
lease with other stipulations. 
The acceptance rate for CRS leases in National Forests seems like-
ly to be as low as 10 percent.209 There are likely to be no cost savings 
to an agency if it still has to do full environmental analysis for the 
majority of the tracts in a given area. In sum, the CRS policy is 
wasteful because it places large costs on industry for the sake of 
small savings to the Forest Service. 
FIGURE 2 
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There has been considerable industry opposition to the CRS, since 
the contingent nature of a lessee's entitlement under the CRS makes 
his investment more speculative.21o In addition to the great risk of 
not finding valuable oil or gas, the CRS lessee risks not being able to 
develop a discovery. This risk may discourage exploration and, 
where development is limited after successful prospecting, the pro-
duction cost of oil and gas may be increased. Both are contrary to na-
tional energy policy.211 Imposing the cost of this increased risk on in-
208. 48 Fed. Reg. 3370 (Jan. 25, 1983). 
209. See supra note 205. 
210. See supra text and note at note 199. 
211. See DOl REPORT 1981, supra note 10, at cover letter, 1. 
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dustry is poor policy because it is justified only by a relatively tiny 
cost saving to government. In fact, faced with a choice, industry 
would probably prefer an increase in lease fees to cover environmen-
tal analysis costs. 
The eRS policy is readily understandable with respect to the likely 
institutional motives of the Forest Service. First, the Forest Service 
operates on a fixed budget and is under orders to process leases 
quickly. The eRS allows the Forest Service to avoid the expense and 
delay of initial environmental analysis. Unfortunately, the policy ig-
nores the economic inefficiency of the budget savings achieved and 
that industry would generally wait the time necessary for leases with 
specific stipulations to be issued rather than take eRS leases im-
mediately.212 Second, the Forest Service inevitably is the victim of 
pressure and criticism both from industry and its proponents in the 
Reagan administration as well as from conservationists. The eRS 
policy responds to pro-leasing pressure by allowing the rapid leasing 
of large acreages with little or no lease denial or restriction. The 
agency responds to discontent with the contingent nature of the 
lease rights by stating that the eRS will not be used to prevent 
development of discovered resources.213 It simultaneously states 
that the eRS retains legal authority to prevent development with 
unacceptable impacts.214 Thus, the policy is essentially a non-
decision that delays and legally recognizable commitment and so can 
be painted as favorable to either side of the controversy. In !eality, it 
may satisfy neither. Finally, the eRS embodies an institutional 
mindset that finds the idea of doing environmental analysis on proj-
ects that might very well not result in drilling proposals to be ex-
tremely distasteftU. 
C. NEPA and Other Environmental Implications 
oj the CRS 
From the conservationist viewpoint, the eRS poses a number of 
212. See supra note 205. 
213. CRS Policy Directive, supra note 197, at 1. The Directive also states that "[t]he CRS is 
not to be interpreted as providing for 'staged' leasing, or for withholding of mineral develop-
ment rights." [d. The Forest Service defines staged leasing as "the theoretical concept that 
leases be issued only for exploration and subject to extension by a second level decision dealing 
with development." Memorandum re: Streamlining of Oil and Gas and Geothermal Leasing 
through Deferral of Detailed Analyses to Operation Stage 4 (January 19, 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as CRS Streamlining Memo]. By stating that the CRS leasing is not staged leasing, the 
Forest Service indicates that the decision to allow development is made at the leasing stage 
and not the operating plan stage. See also infra text and note at note 216. 
214. CRS Policy Directive, supra note 197, at 1; CRS Policy Notice, supra note 196. 
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problems. First, there is the concern that once exploration is suc-
cessful, there will be no stopping development regardless of the 
results of environmental analysis. This concern includes the "sunk 
cost" problem of delayed environmental analysis. As the investment 
in a project grows with time, so does its weight relative to the en-
vironmental costs that it must be balanced against in deciding 
whether the project should continue. The chance of environmental 
factors affecting a decision decreases with time. This effect is well 
recognized by the courts and is a prime factor supporting the use of 
an EIS.215 In addition, a great deal of political pressure may be 
generated once exploration is successful. These fears are com-
pounded by such Forest Service statements as: "It is our intention 
that the CRS not be invoked to prevent the development of a 
discovered mineral resource."216 Such statements, apparently 
designed to assuage the fears of industry, conflict directly with the 
agency's claim that the CRS obviates the need for initial en-
vironmental analysis because it will be used to prevent development 
that has unacceptable environmental effects. 217 
Beyond these problems in implementation, the CRS has three 
potential legal deficiencies which could lead to judicial interpreta-
tions of the stipulation contrary to the agency's interpretation. 
These interpretations involve questions about the eventual en-
forceability and effectiveness of the CRS. Under these interpreta-
tions, the CRS would not fully empower the government to prevent 
future development as the Forest Service claims, and CRS-issuance 
without environmental analysis would violate NEP A. 
The first and least likely of such interpretations is that the govern-
ment lacks the authority to prevent development under the CRS. 
Although the district court's opinion in Sierra Club v. Peterson 
states broadly that the government has authority to attach restric-
tive stipulations to leases,218 the CRS arguably is distinguishable 
from the Conditional NSO and other stipulations involved in that 
case. For example, an NSO restriction could be called a technical 
stipulation because it imposes a physical limitation on lease ac-
tivities: the lessee may not occupy the surface. In contrast, the CRS 
could be termed a discretionary stipulation since it can be read to 
215_ Environmental Defense Fund. v_ Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir_ 1979) (HAfter 
major investment of both time and money, it is likely that more environmental harm will be 
tolerated"); Latham v. Volpe, 455 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971)_ 
216. CRS Policy Directive, supra note 197, at 1. 
217_ [d. 
218. 17 ERC at 1453. 
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make beneficial use of the leasehold contingent on a future agency 
decision on whether to proceed with development The lower court's 
holding in RMOGA I seems more appropriate in this situation and 
could support such a distinction.219 In language that was disallowed 
but not disapproved by the appellate decision,220 District Judge Kerr 
in RMOGA I reasoned that when Congress authorized the issuance 
of leases in the Mineral Leasing Act it did not intend for the con-
ferred entitlement to be speculative.221 Arguably, the entitlement 
under the CRS is speculative while the entitlement under the NSO 
stipulations, though limited, is not speculative. There is, however, no 
statute or case law currently in force that would directly support 
such an argument. On balance, the above distinction between the 
CRS and NSO stipulations is very contrived. In light of the well 
reasoned decision in Peterson supporting the enforceability of lease 
stipulations even when they prevent development, this distinction 
should not carry any weight. 
Second, there is a small chance that courts will not give effect to 
the CRS provision that lessees may receive no compensation for the 
government's denial of their operating plans. Specifically, a court 
might find that such Forest Service pronouncements as "the CRS 
will not be invoked to prevent the development of a discovered 
mineral resource,"222 engender in the lessee a legitimate property 
expectation, the termination of which constitutes a compensable 
"taking."223 
Third, the government's discretion to limit development under the 
CRS will be significantly eroded if the stipulation is interpreted to 
place on the government a burden of demonstrating unacceptable 
impacts before it may disapprove a leasing plan. In this regard, the 
standard stated in the CRS for operating plan disapproval is whether 
there are unacceptable impacts,224 a limited standard compared with 
the government's usual authority to disapprove lease applications 
that are not in the public interest. 225 In fact, one Forest Service 
219. RMOGA I, 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Rocky Mountain Oil and 
Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 13 ELR 20036 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1982). 
220. See supra note 114. 
221. RMOGA I, 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980). 
222. CRS Policy Directive, supra note 197, at 1. 
223. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1973); Sun Oil Co. v. United 
States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 769 (1978). 
224. The text of the CRS given in CRS Policy Notice, supra note 196, states: "A plan of 
operations shall not be approved if it results in unacceptable impact on other resources, land 
uses, and/or the environment." 
225. 30 U.S.C. § 187 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 936 
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memorandum states that "CRS assumes [the] right to drill and 
develop, unless the government can make a prima facie case against 
it and the operator is unable or unwilling to provide reasonable 
mitigation the government requires."226 This view is consistent with 
the Interior Department policy that generally requires BLM to 
demonstrate the necessity of any restrictions on leases227 and does 
not consider wilderness qualities alone as grounds for restriction. 228 
Such circumscribed ability to limit development under the CRS 
would be a practical barrier to wilderness protection. As a technical 
matter, the CRS policy violates NEPA if the category of "unaccept-
able impacts" that the government may prevent under the CRS is 
narrower than the category of "potential significant impacts" that 
the government is forbidden to commit to without a prior EIS. 
The above deficiencies could be argued in a NEP A suit challenging 
a CRS leasing project. Such a suit would be similar to Peterson, in 
that losing on a claim that a protective stipulation is deficient would 
set a precedent bolstering its protective potential while winning such 
a claim would establish a defect that the agency may have to either 
cure or address in NEP A analysis.229 Environmentalists should con-
sider this possibility from all sides before pursuing one avenue ex-
clusively. 
It is difficult to compare the wilderness preservation value of the 
CRS with that of the EA and EIS leasing approaches due to the 
uncertainties over the legal interpretation and eventual implementa-
tion of the CRS and the outcome of the Peterson appeal. Moreover, 
the substance and not the process of government decisions is what 
ultimately provides environmental protection. The EIS approach has 
many advantages, however, such as public participation2SO and detail 
in environmental analysis, that make it environmentally preferable 
to the CRS. The chief advantage of the CRS is that it purportedly 
does not make a legal commitment to development. Of course, if the 
Peterson court should determine that the non-NSO stipulations used 
under EA leasing also do not commit to development, the one main 
advantage of the CRS over EA leasing would disappear. 
The CRS has three apparent disadvantages. First, it permits much 
faster leasing than the EA approach, which in turn is faster than the 
n.17, affd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
226. CRS Streamlining Memo, supra note 213, at 6. 
227. Dell K. Hatch, 34 I.B.L.A. 274 (1978). See also W. E. Haley, 46 I.B.L.A. 151 (1980). 
228. See supra note 105 (administrative cases). 
229. See supra text and notes following note 135. 
230. 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (1982). 
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EIS approach. Second, it may produce a greater number of drilling 
proposals since drilling proposals may be made on lands where the 
screening function of pre-leasing environmental analysis would have 
prevented prospecting and resultant proposals from ever occurring. 
Finally, development decisions under the CRS occur at the operating 
plan stage and not at the leasing stage, so that pressure to develop at 
the time of decision may be greater. At the operating plan stage, 
favorable prospecting results have been obtained, whereas at the 
leasing stage prospecting has not yet been done. At the operating 
plan stage, the position of the CRS lessee who has been encouraged 
to believe he will be allowed to develop281 can be urged sym-
pathetically. Moreover, an operating plan seems to threaten only one 
tract of a leasing area, while an EA leasing decision appears to affect 
a whole national forest or other leasing area. On the other hand, 
preservationist pressure might be greater when it is actual drilling 
that is proposed rather than just leasing. 
The environmentalist stand on the CRS should hinge on the out-
come of Sierra Club v. Peterson, since the appellate decision may 
determine whether the government can continue the present system 
of large-scale leasing without preparing EISs.282 If the court finds 
that non-NSO stipulations commit to development but affirms the 
EA leasing system, the government may continue to lease with EAs, 
and environmentalists may support the CRS as a more environmen-
tally protective alternative. If the court affirms the current system 
by finding that non-NSO stipulations can prevent development, then 
the CRS loses its chief advantage and environmentalists may prefer 
the EA system. Finally, if the court disapproves the current system, 
the choice may be CRS leasing or full EISs before leasing, with en-
vironmentalists likely choosing the latter. In any event, the support 
of one leasing approach over another is directed toward the attain-
ment of some rational, environmentally responsible decisionmaking 
in a leasing system in need of substantial improvement. 
V. CRITICISM OF CURRENT LEASING POLICY 
The government's neglect of the procedures mandated by NEPA, 
discussed above, contributes to a program that is environmentally ir-
responsible in substance. In particular, the government leases in-
discriminately and enmeshes itself in a web of inconsistent policy 
231. See supra note 213; text and note at note 216. 
232. See supra text and notes at notes 189-95. 
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statements which preclude the assessment of environmental prob-
lems raised by public lands leasing. 
A. Indiscriminate Leasing 
The current leasing pattern is indiscriminate in four respects. 
First, the government seems to be willing to lease nearly any 
wilderness land that is sought by applicants. Second, it is trying to 
lease quickly. Third, leases in a given area are issued on a blanket 
rather than a selective basis. Finally, leases are issued with insuffi-
ciently protective stipulations. 
As to the first defect, it is apparently government policy to give oil 
and gas leasing complete priority over wilderness considerations. 
Leases are to be issued in any area for which there are applications, 
with wilderness as the dedicated land use only in those areas that are 
not sought for development.233 This approach stems largely from the 
current administration's high priority on domestic energy develop-
ment.234 There have been some efforts to justify this policy by find-
ing a legal obligation to lease. The Wilderness Act is one source for 
this leasing obligation argument. The rationale here is that by set-
ting a deadline of December 1983 for new leasing in designated 
wilderness,235 Congress affirmatively instructed that leasing take 
place in wilderness. Specifically, agency policy prohibits the denial of 
lease applications solely to protect wilderness characteristics236 on 
the theory that the deadline expresses the judgment that such denial 
would be against the public interest.237 A more reasonable reading of 
the statutory deadline, however, is that the Wilderness Act sim-
ply permits leasing prior to the deadline without affecting the 
Secretary's broad authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to decide 
whether to lease. 
The holding of Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus238 is 
a second source for the leasing obligation argument. That case in-
volved a challenge to the government's failure to process lease ap-
plications on a three million acre area of Wyoming, Idaho, and Col-
orado. The court found that the failure to process lease applications 
233. See generally supra notes 75, 76. 
234. DOl REPORT 1981, supra note 10, at cover letter, 1. 
235. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(dX3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
236. Forest Service Manual 2822.46; Memorandum from Dep't of the Interior Solicitor to 
Director, Bureau of Land Management (October 19, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Lease Denial 
Memo]. 
237. Lease Denial Memo, supra note 236. 
238. 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980). 
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amounted to an administrative withdrawal of lands requiring notice 
to Congress under section 201 of FLPMA. It ordered the govern-
ment either to promptly process the leases or provide the requisite 
notice to Congress. The Reagan administration would like to find an 
affirmative duty to lease in this holding. The action ordered in M oun-
tain States was the giving of proper notice or the processing of ap-
plications; this is not the same as the issuance of leases. In fact, with 
the appellate decision in Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association 
(RMOGA Il),289 there is now no law dictating a duty to issue 
leases.24o A balanced leasing policy must begin with the premise that 
some areas should be selected for leasing and other areas reserved 
for wilderness by denial of lease applications. 
The second problem is that the rate at which the government 
wants to lease is too fast to allow decisions which are environmental-
ly sensible. Rapid leasing is a declared policy of the government, 241 
and, of course, is a key goal of the CRS policy; it also supports the 
EA leasing approach.242 The haste may be partially motivated by a 
desire to get as much land as possible leased while the current ad-
ministration is still in office. At least one Regional Office of the 
Forest Service has admitted that the increased pace of mineral leas-
ing is resulting in "an inability to adequately protect and manage the 
Forest System. "248 The detailed environmental analysis required for 
prudent development of wilderness land is being sacrifieed by the 
government's determination to mass produce leasing decisions. 
Third, more often than not, the leasing decisions reached by the 
government involve blanket leasing of entire administrative areas 
with stipulations that are grossly inadequate. For example, the 
Forest Service recently proposed issuing leases covering all of Ver-
mont's 292,000 acre Green Mountain National Forest except for the 
9 percent of the land that is designated wilderness or "municipal 
watershed."244 In the Palisades Further Planning Area discussed 
239. 13 ELR 20036 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1982). 
240. Haley v. Senton, 281 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Interior Secretary has "discre-
tionary power, rather than a positive mandate to lease" under the Mineral Leasing Act); Udall 
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,4 (1965) (Secretary has "discretion to refuse to issue any lease at all on 
a given tract" under the Mineral Leasing Act). 
241. DOl REPORT 1982, supra note 76, at 1. 
242. CRS Policy Notice, supra note 196. 
243. DRAFT: FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE 
EASTERN REGION (1981), quoted in Williams, Farewell to a Forest, Boston Magazine 133 
(November 1982). 
244. GREEN MOUNTAIN EA, supra note 17, at 1 (entitled Decision Notice and Finding of No 
Significant Impact). 
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earlier, the government has applied stipulations that surface oc-
cupancy is prohibited on 80 percent of the leased acreage but lessees 
have been granted development and access rights to the remaining 
20 percent of land which exists mostly as islands surrounded by NSO 
areas.246 For development to occur on these approved areas the 
government will have to allow access roads to be built.246 These 
roads will be built over the large acreage areas that the government 
has already determined to be too environmentally sensitive for the 
construction of roads or drill sites. 
Fourth, in addition to the inadequacy of the stipulations that are 
eventually applied,247 there is an unfortunate trend toward issuing 
an EA for an entire administrative area without even discussing any 
specific application of stipulations. For example, in the EA embody-
ing the decision to lease 200,000 acres of the Chattachoochee Na-
tional Forest in Georgia, there is no discussion of the specific sites 
that will be protected by stipulations and no indication of what 
stipulations will be used.248 In such cases, a FONSI in the document 
is obviously based on mere supposition rather than any real analysis. 
B. Inconsistent Policy and Lack of Environmental Goals 
In pursuing its leasing goals, the government has articulated con-
tradictory policies on key matters. Specifically, the government con-
tinues to be inconsistent concerning the scope of its ability to prevent 
environmental damage to lands it has leased, its ability to perform 
meaningful environmental analysis at the leasing stage, and its 
policy toward leasing where sharp conflict exists between develop-
ment and other resource values. 
First, as discussed above, the agencies frequently take contradic-
tory stances on whether they have the authority and resolve to 
preclude development on leases once leases are issued. At least for 
leases with NSO stipulations, the agencies and their critics agree 
that authority to preclude surface occupancy is retained. With 
regard to almost all other stipulations-non-NSO stipulations as well 
as the new CRS-the agencies themselves adopt contradictory posi-
tions. For example, in the Little Granite Creek litigation and in a 
245. PALISADES EA, supra note 53, at A-18. 
246. It is conceivable that helicopters could be used as a means of access to these "islands." 
However, there is no statement in the lease or stipulations that this extremely expensive step 
can be required. 
247. See supra text and notes at notes 139-77. 
248. CHAITAHOOCHEE EA, supra note 15. 
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related regional solicitor's opinion, the government claims it lacks 
authority to prevent development once it issues leases containing 
non-NSO stipulations, regardless of the environII\ental conse-
quences.249 By contrast, government lawyers repUdiated the 
regional solicitor's opinion in the Palisades litigation260 where the 
agencies' position is that they have retained the right to prevent any 
activities that would have significant impacts.261 Similarly, the 
government simultaneously represents that it can and will invoke 
the CRS to prevent any development that has unacceptable en-
vironmental consequences but that the CRS will not be invoked to 
prevent the development of a discovered mineral resource.262 
The government also contradicts itself on whether it is able to per-
form meaningful, site-specific environmental analysis at the leasing 
stage. As the EA for leasing in the High Uintas in Utah dem-
onstrates,268 the Forest Service is quite capable of producing such 
analysis. In this EA, lease denial and leasing with stipulations were 
proposed on a lease-by-Iease basis using a system of analysis that 
evaluated the wildlife, fish, recreational, visual, soil, and water 
resources of each lease. Instead of the typical blanket leasing pro-
posal, the EA contained a combination of no leasing, NSO, and 
special and standard stipulation recommendations.264 This example 
of sensible leasing policy contrasts sharply with the government's 
assertion in the Palisades litigation that detailed environmental 
analysis was "not meaningfully possible" and that an EIS at the leas-
ing stage could only be "unfocused."266 
Government policy is also inconsistent on the issue of whether 
leases should issue for land where development probably will not be 
permitted. Despite the Interior Board of Land Appeals266 doctrine 
that such lands should not be leased at all,267 the government has 
249. Opinion of the Acting Regional Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (October 10, 1980). 
See supra text and notes at notes 163-65. 
250. Transcript of Proceedings on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 21, Sierra Club v. 
Peterson, 17 ERC 1449. The Regional Solicitor's Opinion was also repudiated in the RMOGA 
litigation. Reply Brieffor Federal Defendants at 15 n.15, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. 
Watt, 13 ELR 20036 (10th Cir. Nov. 30, 1982). 
251. Palisades Federal Appellees Brief, supra note 159, at 31. 
252. See supra text and notes at notes 216-17. 
253. HIGH UNITAS EA, supra note 13. 
254. Id. at vi. 
255. Palisades Federal Appellees' Brief, supra note 159, at 32. 
256. The Interior Board of Land Appeals is a unit of the Department of the Interior that 
hears administrative appeals. 
257. Bill J. Maddox, 24 I.B.L.A. 147, 150 (1976) ("[N]o lease should issue with stipulations 
so restrictive that the use of the land for any purpose associated with the production of oil and 
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issued leases in a number of areas that are so thoroughly covered and 
surrounded by NSO restrictions that they are outside of the range of 
any current slant drilling technology. 258 
In their zeal to promote oil and gas development on public land, the 
agencies minimize environmental analysis, lease indiscriminately, 
and contradict themselves in policy and deeds. There is ample oppor-
tunity for improvement. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED LEASING POLICY 
A. Selective Leasing 
The government should curb the indiscriminate leasing of 
wilderness suitable lands and lease such lands only on a selective 
basis after full environmental analysis. Selectivity in leasing should 
extend both to the decision of which wilderness candidate areas 
should be opened to leasing and, once it is determined which areas 
are to be leased, to the question of which portions of each area should 
be leased. Leasing only portions of a lease application area has a 
number of advantages. First, while lands cannot be "unleased," 
withheld portions of a leasing area can always be leased later. Poor 
exploration results on one tract may lead industry or the govern-
ment to conclude that it is not worth leasing an adjacent portion. By 
postponing decisions on those tracts which appear least promising 
for energy or most in need of protection, the agencies could avoid 
altogether the conflict and expense of environmental analysis and 
decisionmaking. They would always have the benefit of information 
developed during the delay. In this light, selective leasing respects 
both the Forest Service's limited resources for environmental deci-
sionmaking and management259 and industry's limited ability to ac-
celerate its current rate of exploration.260 In fact, oil companies are 
gas is totally precluded"); Stanley M. Edwards, 24 I.B.L.A. 12 (1976) ("Stipulations cannot be 
used essentially to withdraw lands from mineral leasing"); A. Helander, 15 I.B.L.A. 107 
(1974); John Snyder 15 I.B.L.A. 253 (1974). 
258. Sierra Club's Palisades Memorandum, supra note 118, at 13-17. Slant drilling is 
limited to a horizontal reach of about one mile in the Western Overthrust Belt. RARE II 
Wilderness Praposals, Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Environment, Soil Con-
servation & Forestry of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition & Forestry, 96th 
Congo 1st Sess. 110 (Feb. 6, 8, 9, 1979) (report on directional drilling prepared for Senator 
John Melcher of Montana by ARCO Oil & Gas Co.). Thus, some NSO leases in the Palisades are 
too far from non-NSO areas to be developed using current technology. PALISADES EA, supra 
note 53, at A-18. 
259. See supra text and note at note 243. 
260. The rate at which new rigs can be produced currently limits the rate of drilling. Lohr, 
The Forest Oil Rush of the Eighties, N.Y. Times Magazine 20,22 (Aug. 30, 1981). 
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to some extent the victims of the competitive nature of public land 
leasing and might be just as happy with this system. Specifically, 
when lease issuance in one area appears imminent, oil companies are 
obliged to apply for neighboring leases, not because they have a high 
current interest in the area, but because someone else will take the 
area and preclude their leasing it if they do not lease it themselves. 
This defensive approach to leasing is fostered by the profusion of 
speculators in the public leasing system, who takes leases only in the 
hope of later assigning them to oil companies at a profit.261 The 
utilization of a truly selective leasing system should prevent this. 
B. Thorough Environmental Analysis 
A second suggested principle is that leasing should occur only after 
thorough environmental analysis in the form of an EIS or in connec-
tion with the Forest Planning Process.262 An EIS is desirable 
because it requires detailed, site-specific environmental :analysis, 
public participation, and an inquiry that explores rather than con-
ceals resource conflicts. Since the stipulations of each lease are the 
key to protecting each tract's particular resources as well as to max-
imizing the lessee's opportunity to work his lease within the con-
straints of environmental protection, the environmental analysis 
must include site-specific resource evaluation. Detailed analysis is 
particularly important because government leasing proposals tend 
to avoid the realities of their inherent land use choices by empha-
sizing agency ability to mitigate impacts and discussing conflicts on-
ly in vague terms.263 
The Forest Service has proven in a few instances that it is quite 
capable of detailed and prudent environmental analysis and decision-
making.264 Specificity is not necessarily confined to an EIS, and 
261. Leasing Policy Review, supra note 62, at 50-51. 
262. The process was mandated by the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 604 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Forest Planning Process is an attempt to construct an integrated 
and evolving set of land use plans for the National Forest System. The first round of plans is 
still in preparation. Planning is undertaken in a four-layer hierarchial system proeeeding from 
the top down. National objectives and policies are set by the Chief Forester. Speeific planning 
generally is undertaken at each of the four levels in the overall plan: the national, "area", na-
tional forest, and "unit" level, with unit size ranging from under 50,000 to several hundred 
thousand acres. EISs are to be prepared at the area and national forest levels, but not at the 
unit level. 46 C.F.R. §§ 219.9(b), 219.11(b) (1982). There are numerous other provisions for 
public partieipation. See generally Wilson, Land Management Planning Processes of the Forest 
Service, 8 ENVT'L L. 461 (1978). 
263. See, e.g., CHATTAHOOCHEE EA, supra note 15; GREEN MOUNTAIN EA, supra note 17. 
264. See supra text and notes at notes 253-54. 
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there have been a few leasing EAs that are specific and embody 
balanced decisions.266 But since many EAs have not been specific or 
balanced,266 the EIS, with its legally enforceable requirement for 
detail,267 should be required for leasing decisions. 
The EIS is also preferable to the EA because it requires public par-
ticipation.268 To the extent that an action is environmentally harm-
ful, public scrutiny subjects an agency to criticism either for the 
harms themselves or the agency's failure to admit them. It also pro-
motes consideration of the desires of a broader range of the public 
than those of the industry and conservation interests that are 
routine agency clients. Further, EISs alert Congress and the Ex-
ecutive to a proposal's impacts and alternatives.269 
Theoretically, both EAs and EISs are documents that guide agen-
cy decisions. In reality, they largely are used to justify agency deci-
sions. Since an EA is a sufficient decision document only when it 
reaches a no impact result, EAs must justify decisions by arguing 
that a proposal will have no significant impacts. EISs on the other 
hand, may admit impacts and still be valid. EISs allow for greater 
disclosure and have a greater possibility of being honest and ac-
curate documents than EAs because they can admit resource 
tradeoffs, still satisfy NEPA, and support the agency's decision. 
They have a greater chance of guiding rather than just rationalizing 
agency decisions. 
The ongoing Forest Planning Process is an alternative to lease 
proposal EISs.270 In this process, detailed land use plans with accom-
panying EISs are formulated for each Forest Service region and 
each national forest. An advantage of this approach is that it pro-
vides an opportunity to make decisions that consider the land 
management resources of an entire forest or region. Land use for 
mineral development as well as for wilderness, wildlife, recreation, 
265. HIGH UNITAS EA, supra note 13. 
266. See supra note 263. 
267. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502-1503 (1982). 
268. 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (1982). 
269. Natural Resources Defense Coun. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
270. See supra note 261. One provision of the Energy Security Act would seem to pose a 
barrier to using the forest planning process to plan leasing in stating that the Department of 
Agriculture should continue to process leases on national forest land "notwithstanding the 
current status of any plan being prepared" through the forest planning process. P.L. No. 
96-294, 94 Stat. 611, 710 (1980), 43 U.S.C. § 8855. Nevertheless, the provision is vague and 
has apparently been given little attention. Further, in placing a moratorium on the processing 
of leases on designated wilderness and Forest Service wilderness candidates lands, see text 
and notes at notes 87, 94, Congress has more recently expressed a contrary intent. 
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timber and grazing can be considered in terms of area-wide goals 
rather than in the abstract, as is the case with lease proposal en-
vironmental analyses. The various agencies should consider the ap-
plicability of this system to their own leasing operations. 
The land management agencies currently operate under a leader-
ship that considers extensive leasing on public lands including 
wilderness to be an urgent priority. 271 They are subject to substan-
tial industry pressure. Environmental analysis and public scrutiny 
are, therefore, essential ingredients to prudent development deci-
sions and may be done practicably. 
C. Pricing of Leases 
The overall leasing system would be improved if the base price for 
leasing wilderness candidate lands were to be increased. The current 
leasing price structure effectively subsidizes oil and gas leasing on 
public land and thereby creates an artificial incentive for eompanies 
to lease federal land instead of state or private land or offshore 
tracts.272 Specifically, 97 percent of federal land is leased non-
competitively, with a set charge of one dollar per acre per year and a 
12.5 percent royalty.273 The one-dollar rental figure has not been 
changed since 1977, despite the fact that the price for domestic oil 
has more than doubled since then.274 By definition, leasing at a fixed 
price does not recoup fair market value. In fact, there are usually 
numerous parties willing to take a given noncompetitive lease by the 
time it is issued, all of whom are potential bidders.276 
The price issue is complicated by the presence of various national 
policies, some of which relate only indirectly to land use, yet retain 
some validity. The economic and national security reasons for this 
subsidy may be defensible for some federal lands, where conflicting 
alternative uses may be economically less productive or even non-
existent. The subsidy is not defensible, however, on wilderness 
suitable lands where there is a highly valued alternative use. It sim-
ply makes no sense to lease our prized pristine lands for the same 
subsidized price used to stimulate development of other federal land. 
For the last fifteen years there have been strong initiatives within 
271. DOl REPORT 1981, supra note 10, as cover letter, 1; DOl REPORT 1982, supra note 76, 
at 1. 
272. See Sprague & Julian, supra note 71, at 520-22. 
273. Leasing Policy Review, supra note 62, at 39. 
274. Id. at 50. 
275. Id. at 50-51. 
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both the Interior Department and in Congress for making oil and gas 
leasing rates more competitive. For example, during the last two 
Congresses, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources has reported out bills that would put all onshore leasing 
on a competitive system.276 Although a rate increase for wilderness 
leasing could obviously be enacted legislatively, there is sufficient 
authority under existing law for this change to be undertaken ad-
ministratively.277 
A price increase could take place in either a competitive or a non-
competitive system and the increase could occur in either the yearly 
rental rate or the royalty rate or in the form of bonus payments. One 
obvious benefit of a price hike is the increased revenues the govern-
ment would derive from leasing at rates closer to fair market value. 
The essential element of any reform would be an increase in the mini-
mum rate charged for leasing. This would restrict leasing demand to 
the more promising areas by eliminating interest in the lands that 
are only marginally promising. Balanced wilderness leasing requires 
a system to screen out lands that will not be leased because of their 
relatively high environmental value and low mineral potential. The 
current system consists of a value-laden choice made by an agency 
which is under intense political pressure and possesses little access 
to prospecting data.278 With a price increase, much of the decision 
would repose in an economic-based choice made collectively by the oil 
exploration industry using the best available technical and geological 
information. The elegance of this system is that it relies on market 
prices, which reflect technical and geological information, to ensure 
that the wilderness lands sacrificed for development are those which 
are truly promising for development. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Oil and gas development is essentially incompatible with wil-
derness values. Development of virtually any kind by its nature con-
flicts with other environmental values. Rising oil prices, new pros-
276. Federal Oil and Gas Leasing Act of 1980, S.1637, S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1980). The committee reported on a similar bill in the previous Congress. Higher lease prices 
have also been urged by BLM economists. See Sprague & Julian, supra note 71, at 523-25. 
277. The only way to administratively expand the category of lands subject to competitive 
leasing would be to expand the definition of "known geologic structure." 43 C.F.R. S§ 
3100.0-.5(a) (1982). The rental rate for noncompetitive lands could not be increased ad-
ministratively. 30 U.S.C. SS 181-226 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
278. There is generally no mechanism providing the government with access to industry ex-
ploration data. 
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pecting and drilling technology, and the discovery of the Eastern 
and Western Overthrust belts have made oil and gas leasing in 
wilderness areas the focus of vigorous controversy since the late 
1970s. Despite the current administration's efforts, new mineral 
development within the National Wilderness Preservation System 
has been banned indefinitely. Nevertheless, leasing on wilderness 
areas that are candidates for inclusion in the system has proceeded 
apace, particularly in 1981 and 1982. 
The agencies consistently undertake wilderness leasing without 
preparing an environmental impact statement, the prerequiste im-
posed by the National Environmental Policy Act for any federal ac-
tion that may have significant environmental effects. This approach 
to leasing has been challenged in the Palisades litigation, Sierra Club 
v. Peterson. The Palisades plaintiff in Peterson convincingly argues 
that leasing major wilderness acreages without lease stipulations 
that retain veto power over development risks that such develop-
ment will cause significant environmental impacts and, therefore, re-
quires a prior EIS. From the standpoint of judicial review, NEPA's 
mandate for an EIS stands regardless of the reasonableness of the 
agency action, the cost or difficulty of EIS preparation, or the quali-
ty of any environmental analysis performed. The courts and agencies 
charged with this mandate should not shirk it. 
In the face of Peterson and similar challenges, the land manage-
ment agencies have issued some leases under the new Contingent 
Rights Stipulation. The CRS purports to avoid the EIS requirement 
by making the drilling rights of oil and gas lessees conditional on a 
subsequent agency decision to proceed with development. The CRS 
has received mixed reviews from environmental and industry fac-
tions because of uncertainties over its effect and implementation. It 
may turn out to be a device that facilitates development in 
wilderness by avoiding the serious environmental decisionmaking 
envisioned by NEPA. Alternatively, the CRS may be an oilman's 
nightmare that vetos development only after lessees have invested 
heavily in prospecting. The inadequacies of the CRS as a compromise 
approach indicate the need to confront the basic issues underlying 
the Peterson appeal. 
As part of a long-term improvement of public lands leasing, the 
agencies should curb their present attempt at the wholesale leasing 
of wilderness land. Instead, they should lease wilderness selectively, 
and only with detailed environmental analysis developed in in-
dividual EISs or studies similar to those in the forest planning proc-
ess. Finally, an end to subsidy prices for federal oil and gas leases, at 
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least on wilderness land, would be a profitable and administratively 
simple step toward a rational selectivity in wilderness leasing. 
